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Abstract
China has embarked on a massive expansion of nuclear power that may fundamentally change
the global nuclear industry, for better or for worse. Some industry observers argue that the
incumbent nuclear power companies are already losing their position of leadership to emergent
Chinese actors. Others argue that the growing Chinese nuclear power industry creates more
opportunities for all. In this thesis, I discuss Chinese nuclear power development in relation to
the global nuclear power industry. I argue that understanding three aspects of the development of
China's nuclear industry help understand the opportunities and threats that come with it: (1)
common practices of the global nuclear industry in regard to technology transfer and localization
(2) different global trends towards deverticalization and integration and (3) idiosyncrasies of the
Chinese manufacturing ecosystem that affect global nuclear power supply chains. I argue that
Chinese and foreign companies, and policy makers, need to comprehend these principles well as
they inform corporate and national strategies, affecting the present and future competitiveness of
nuclear power industry actors globally.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Thesis
With 15 operating nuclear power reactors and 11.3 GW of installed capacity in China, the
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission has called for a large scale expansion
of its nuclear power program, targeting more than 70 GW by 2020 and 200 GW by 2030.
Currently, more than 25 nuclear reactors are under construction in China, accounting for almost
half of the global nuclear new builds (WNA China, 2012).
In addition to the installation of the targeted capacity, China has declared technological self-
sufficiency and the buildup of a globally competitive nuclear industry as its explicit goal (Xu,
2010). This development has caught the interest of many observers in industry, politics and
academia. How should the emerging Chinese nuclear industry be viewed? Are we witnessing an
unprecedented expansion that will change the global nuclear industry fundamentally? Or does
the growth of the Chinese nuclear industry follow established precedents and familiar trajectories
pioneered by other nations with nuclear industries?
Today, in the United States in particular, the rise of China's nuclear industry is widely viewed
with suspicion, if not anxiety. Politicians, industry representatives and members of the public
fear that China, through the sheer momentum of its massive expansion, could come to dominate
an industry that the US had led for decades.
The nuclear power industry originated in the US with the first civilian nuclear reactor at
Shippingport. More than 100 commercial nuclear power plants then followed. The CEO of a
major US nuclear reactor company once claimed that his organization "invented the nuclear
industry" (Interview 10142011). It is from that perspective that one has to interpret efforts like
those of Senator Jim Webb (D., VA) to pass legislation in order to prevent American nuclear
companies from "giving away technologies to China." Webb claims that "the transfer of publicly
supported proprietary technologies by American firms to China - and potentially other countries
- clearly and unequivocally places the competitive advantage of the American economy at risk"
(Webb, 2011).
Senator Webb most explicitly criticizes technology transfer agreements between the US-based
nuclear reactor vendor Westinghouse and its Chinese client, the State Nuclear Power Technology
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Corporation (SNPTC). These agreements involve the transfer of 75,000 documents, as reported
by the Financial Times (Hook, 2010). Pundits such as University of California, Irvine professor
and author of "Death by China," Peter Navarro, speak of "Westinghouse's naivete"' in
"surrendering those 75,000 documents." (Navarro and Autry, 2011) Some US industry
representatives refer to Westinghouse's involvement in China as "selling its soul" (Interview
11182011).
Little has been said, however, on what exactly such technology transfer agreements mean. What
is the value of those 75,000 documents, and what does a company like Westinghouse receive in
return? And more generally: How do partnerships between foreign and Chinese companies in the
nuclear industry affect both parties' prospects? What are the roles of today's foreign and Chinese
companies in nuclear power plant projects and what may be their roles in the future?
In this thesis, I suggest answers to such questions as I discuss characteristics of global nuclear
equipment and technology value chains and nuclear power plant construction projects and how
they affect, and are affected by, China's own rising nuclear industry.
Much has been written on China's nuclear policy and on individual organizations in the Chinese
nuclear industry. Xu (2010) wrote the book "The Politics of Nuclear Energy in China" which
contains a comprehensive history of the Chinese nuclear industry and a rich characterization of
different actors. Zhou (2010) and Zhou et al. (2011) have repeatedly analyzed the prospects of
the Chinese nuclear industry. Moreover, the World Nuclear Association provides several detailed
fact pages on the Chinese nuclear industry, describing reactor types and individual actors (WNA
China, 2012).
I do not intend to add more on individual Chinese firms or on Chinese nuclear policy-making
since much has been said on these topics. Rather, I focus on specific aspects of the Chinese
nuclear industry which I have not seen covered in sufficient detail: technology transfer and
localization, organization and product architectures, and idiosyncrasies of the Chinese economy
as a whole which shape the development of its nuclear industry.
These topics make up the three main parts of this thesis.
10
In Part I, I investigate the nature of technology transfer and localization in the global nuclear
industry from its beginnings to today. The purpose of this part is to better understand common
practices of the global nuclear industry and its historical path.
Part II begins with a broad analysis of the nuclear value chain, discussing how value in nuclear
power plant construction projects is spread across various tasks and organizations. Next, I
discuss different organization architectures and product architectures that have emerged in the
nuclear industry and their impact on supply chain organization and innovation strategies. The
purpose of this chapter is to better understand the current global environment for nuclear power
industries, the backdrop to China's growing nuclear industry.
In Part III, I present idiosyncrasies of China's economic development which shape its nuclear
industry. Chapters in this part aim to present the peculiar local environment from which the
Chinese nuclear industry emerged.
Finally, I close with conclusions drawn on each of the three topic areas.
1.2 Data
This thesis will draw on literature from the academic fields of nuclear engineering, political
economy, management, and international relations as well as on industry reports, conferences
and exhibitions. In addition, I carried out more than 50 interviews with representatives of
companies across the nuclear supply chain from 2010-2011. This includes companies from
China, the US, France, Germany, Austria, and Japan. Table 1 describes the different fields the
respective companies are involved in.
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Field No. of firms interviewed
Reactor vendor 4
Architect/Engineer 1
EPC 2
Nuclear construction 1
Key equipment 7
Non-key equipment 10
Commodity equipment and materials 7
Fuel cycle 2
Consulting 2
Research institutes 2
Inspection services 2
Table 1: Interviewed firms by field
PART I - TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND LOCALIZATION
In order to understand the nuclear industry in its present state, and the development of China's
nuclear industry in particular, it is helpful to look at the global industry's origins and emergent
common practices as well as at the development of nuclear industries in other countries.
In this part, I discuss the role of technology transfer in the global nuclear industry both
historically and today. I illustrate how technology transfer led to other forms of collaboration and
often to long term cooperation that took on different forms, from research partnerships to future
supplier or client relationships. I describe the case of South Korea's nuclear industry and its
partnership with Westinghouse in more detail to demonstrate that point.
2 Technology transfer and localization in the nuclear industry
2.1 Overview
The practice of transferring advanced technology along with the sale of products emerged with
large projects and competing bidders which equipped the ordering party with significant
bargaining power and became common industry practice. In addition to the products purchased,
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technology transfer would provide knowledge on how to independently use, maintain, or produce
technical artifacts. In the course of the 2 0 1h century, technology transfer agreements had become
common place in many advanced sectors, as noted by Michael Lemaire of Alsthom-France
(1985): "It is well known that large export contracts are increasingly subject to technology
transfer requirements, particularly where advanced technologies are involved." Lemaire
specified: "The objective is generally to oversee the transmittal of engineering and
manufacturing documents, to train the client's personnel, and to provide on-the-spot technical
assistance." The nuclear power industry, from its inception, was particularly affected by this
practice.
The first nuclear power plants to produce electricity commercially through nuclear fission were
built by the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which had a considerable head start on
other nations due to their research efforts during and immediately following World War II.
While both nations were restrictive in sharing knowledge on nuclear fission during the
immediate postwar years, President Eisenhower's Atoms of Peace program of 1953 caused a
major change in the US position. For reasons of Cold War strategy, worldwide cooperation to
help other countries build nuclear power industries was suddenly encouraged (Katz and Marwah,
1982). The importance of the Atoms for Peace program can hardly be overstated and James
Donnelly of AECL-Canada described its effects as follows (1985): "Never in history has the
world engaged in such an open display of technological generosity as that which has
characterized the peace time application of nuclear technology started under the Eisenhower
'Atoms for Peace' initiative. The first Geneva conference (1955) opened the book on nuclear
technology for all the world to read."
American companies such as Westinghouse, General Electric (GE) and Combustion Engineering
(CE) have since built nuclear power plants and transferred nuclear power technology to Iran,
Pakistan, Belgium, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Germany, and France. Among these, France, Germany, South Korea, and
Japan later developed their own internationally competitive nuclear vendor companies. Apart
from the United States and the latter countries, only Canada, Russia and China have built nuclear
reactors in other nations.
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While the Soviet Union transferred nuclear technology to its satellite states, Germany transferred
nuclear technology to Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands. France
transferred nuclear technology to Belgium, South Africa, South Korea and China. Canada
transferred nuclear technology to India, Pakistan, Argentina, China, South Korea, Romania, and
China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan.
This section showed that technology transfer has a long tradition in the nuclear industry and has
been practiced many times, often with multiple "generations" of transfers where former
recipients turned into later transferees.
2.2 International conferences on nuclear technology transfer
The prevalence of nuclear power projects involving technology transfer led to the organization of
a number of international conferences on technology transfer in the nuclear industry, of which
two of the largest were "Transfer of Nuclear Technology" in Iran 1977 and "Nuclear Technology
Transfer" in Spain 1985. Both conferences were supported by leading nuclear reactor vendors
including Westinghouse, GE, the French Framatome and the 6 erman Siemens/KWU (the latter
two of which later merged to become today's Areva).
Comments like those of Chong K. Lewe and Donald L. Couchman of NUS Corporation, a
leading consultancy for nuclear projects, illustrate clearly how widespread the practice of
technology transfer had become by 1977: "A developing country planning its first nuclear power
plant will have two principal goals - to get the plant constructed and to acquire practical know-
how on design and engineering as well as all aspects of project management in order to reduce to
a minimum its dependence on foreign contractors for later plants. " The following sections will
provide concrete examples to back up that claim by describing a number of prominent cases.
2.2.1 Siemens/KWU
During the 1985 Madrid conference, German reactor vendor Siemens/KWU stressed that it
routinely offers "complete engineering technology transfer that could also be adapted to include
complete manufacturing technology transfer to meet the demands and capabilities of the
recipient country." This would include "manufacturing of all components" and a "full range
upgrading of national industry." Eventually, this could lead to "complete proficiency in the new
technology" and "independence in all fields of nuclear technology as quickly as possible." (HUttl,
1985). Siemens/KWU specified that technology transfer is carried out through: "1. Transfer of
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documents 2. Man-to-man transfer (hence the foundations are laid for future technology
independence) 3. Management know-how and assurance that there are no gaps in the transfer
process." Siemens/KWU's largest nuclear power plant projects outside of Germany include the
nuclear power plants Angra II in Brazil, Atucha in Argentina, G6sgen in Switzerland, and
Bushehr in Iran.
2.2.2 GE
As summarized by Neil L. Felmus of GE (1985), GE helped "to establish broad-based nuclear
engineering capabilities throughout the world" following the Atoms for Peace program. In the
1960s, GE provided extensive assistance to German and Japanese companies, among others.
When the original license agreements expired in the 1970s, new technology exchange
agreements, so called Technical Cooperation Agreements, were struck with companies from both
countries. Under such agreements, GE "continued exchanging technical information and
operating experience" and "expanded the relationship to include joint research activities in areas
that are of mutual interest." This led to the Japanese-American joint development of the
advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR), a nuclear reactor that "incorporates not only the best
technological features developed in Japan and the United States, but also incorporates
technology that originated with other BWR technical associates in Germany, Italy and Sweden."
The ABWR was later ordered by Japan, the United States and Taiwan. For GE, technology
transfer was clearly not a one-way street. Rather, over time, the company came to benefit from
its relationships with its clients and partners around the world and secured new business
opportunities based on joint development initiatives such as the ABWR project. Other benefits
GE was able to reap as a consequence of its technology transfer agreements were opportunities
in servicing facilities, including through maintenance and upgrades: "Our efforts in transferring
engineering technology in recent years has expanded beyond the major suppliers of nuclear
plants and fuels. The growing demand throughout the world for technical services for operating
plants and the updating of those facilities to meet new regulatory and operating requirements
have accelerated our efforts in these areas." Through ample deployment of nuclear reactors and
transfer of technology, GE also built a global reputation as a competent and experienced nuclear
technology service company. The sourcing and installation of new computer based control
systems is but one example of nuclear technology related services offered by GE to former
technology transfer recipients.
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2.2.3 Westinghouse
Westinghouse's C. K. Paulson emphasized during the 1985 Madrid conference that his company
benefitted in three major ways from technology development cooperation programs with partners
to whom nuclear technology had previously been transferred. As benefits he identified (1) more
opportunities to test, deploy and spread state-of-the-art technologies, (2) a more efficient use of
R&D resources, and (3) "well-known synergistic effects due to the cross-fertilization of technical
expertise." He concludes: "The enhanced relationship has a value far greater than anything
measurable in monetary terms. The understanding that is gained of the technical expertise and
working methods of the other organization leads to a better working relationship in all areas."
2.2.4 Framatome, CEGB, ENSA
It was not uncommon for former recipients of technology transfer to later transfer technology
themselves. Framatome, for instance, had received knowhow from Westinghouse on equipment
manufacturing in the 1970s and a few years later delivered reactor pressure vessels to the UK, as
a partner of Westinghouse. The UK in turn benefited from "the greatest possible opportunity to
participate [...] so that PWR technology and manufacturing knowhow is transferred to the fullest
possible extent." as expressed by a representative of the Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB) (George, 1985). Along the same lines, the Spanish nuclear primary cycle equipment
manufacturer Equipos Nucleares-Spain (ENSA) "accumulated experience first at the receiving
end, benefitting from technology transfer from others, and later, at the transmitting end,
instructed different groups with little or no previous experience in engineering, quality assurance,
metallurgy, etc." (Espallardo, 1985)
This section introduced some of the basic mechanisms as well as the reciprocity of technology
transfer in previous cases by providing concise examples across a spectrum of companies and
countries that were engaged in technology transfer on both the transferring and receiving end.
The next section will go into more depth, discussing in greater detail a case of technology
transfer that led to later forms of partnership and collaboration: the case of South Korea's
KEPCO and Westinghouse.
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2.3 Case: Technology transfer in South Korea
2.3.1 General history
Among the countries that had been recipients of nuclear technology transfer, France, Germany,
Japan, Canada, and South Korea have emerged as major nuclear reactor vendors in international
markets. In this section, I discuss the development of the nuclear industry in South Korea as one
of the five countries that have brought forth internationally respected vendors of nuclear power
plants based on previous technology transfer.
South Korea had received various forms of support from the Atoms for Peace program beginning
in the 1950s, including research and other assistance for creating political institutions required
for a national nuclear power program. It was not until 1978, however, that South Korea began
operating its first nuclear reactor. Today, 34 years later, South Korea has built 23 reactors with
20.7 GWe of installed capacity, generating one-third of that country's total electricity (WNA
South Korea, 2012). By 2030, Korea aims to build more than 15 new reactors domestically while
exporting 80 reactors. The World Nuclear Association expects South Korea to be on its way to
become the world's fourth largest vendor of nuclear reactors behind the USA (Westinghouse and
GE), France (Areva) and Russia (Rosatom) with a 20% global market share. In 2011, South
Korean firms celebrated their first international bidding success on winning a $20 billion
contract to build four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates, outcompeting French, US
and Japanese firms. The South Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy declared that "nuclear
power-related business will be the most profitable market after automobiles, semiconductors and
shipbuilding" and "we will promote the industry as a major export business" (WNA South Korea,
2012). The foundation for this development'was laid through extensive technology transfer from
the US, France and Canada over the last four decades.
Park (1992) differentiates between three major phases in South Korea's early development of
commercial nuclear power. The first commercial phase involved the ordering of three turnkey
reactors from the US and Canada which were commissioned between 1978 and 1983. Very few
Korean firms were involved in these early nuclear power plant construction projects and the few
that were involved focused on conventional tasks such as the construction of non-safety related
buildings. During the second phase, six nuclear reactors were built and commissioned between
1985 and 1989 by US and French companies with the increasing participation of Korean industry.
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During the third phase, Korean companies had taken over the projects' overall management
responsibility with US companies being hired as subcontractors. In this phase, two reactors were
built and commissioned in 1995 and 1996. The Korean nuclear industry selected the design of
those two reactors, originally the "System 80" design from CE which is now a part of
Westinghouse, for standardization and scale up and it has since commissioned nine more reactors
of similar design, known as OPR-1000. In 1999, work was completed on the APR-1400 design,
an evolutionary improvement and 40% power uprate from the OPR-1000. Reactors currently
under construction and offered to export markets are APR-1400 reactors. Westinghouse still
owns different kinds of intellectual property for this reactor design. The Koreans decided,
however, to become completely self-sufficient by 2012. Whether they will be able to follow
through on that goal is doubted by some industry observers (Berthelemy and Leveque, 2011).
2.3.2 Equipment manufacturer Doosan
A key player in the Korean nuclear industry is Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction which
was founded in 1962 under the name Korea Heavy Industries and Construction (KHIC). After
the three turnkey reactors of stage 1, and two reactors with relatively low local participation of
stage 2, KHIC was designated to become a major supplier of nuclear power plant equipment in
Korea in 19xy. In 2001, KHIC rebranded to Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction. By then,
the company had developed capabilities for manufacturing key equipment of nuclear power
plants, including nuclear island equipment such as reactor pressure vessels and steam generators
as well as turbine island equipment such as turbines and generators.
KHIC's development of manufacturing capabilities began in the 1976 when it invested $50
million into a large integrated manufacturing complex. The purchase of modem manufacturing
equipment was accompanied by technical license agreements with foreign partners. KHIC did
not have much freedom in choosing its partners. Instead they depended on the choice of the
Korean government, exercised through the state-owned utility KEPCO, for nuclear reactor and
turbine island vendors. In 1976, a technical license agreement and a technology transfer contract
were made with GE for turbine island components and in 1977 with CE for nuclear island
components. Priority was given to fabrication technology and design software. In 1981, KHIC
became a subcontractor to Westinghouse and entered more technology transfer agreements
focusing on steam generators and non-rotating turbine generator components. 83 engineers were
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dispatched to CE, GE and Westinghouse as trainees during this period and KHIC was able to
obtain a series of nuclear certificates from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME), also known as N-stamps.
In the early 1980s, the Korean government decided to order two more nuclear reactors. This time
the Koreans picked French vendor Framatome as there had been concerns over fuel supply
security with relying on the US as a sole provider of plants and fuel. As a consequence of
working with French companies, technology transfer agreements with American companies did
not get extended. New agreements with French companies Framatome and Alsthom were made
in 1981 and 1982 respectively. While Framatome focused on nuclear island components,
Alsthom specialized in conventional islands as well as electrical and control systems. Only a few
years earlier, the French nuclear industry itself had benefitted from extensive technology transfer
from US companies. At this point, however, a Framatome representative described the French
nuclear industry as "totally independent and the sole owner of its technologies, which can be
freely transferred to any country." (Lemaire, 1985) Subsequently, 23 Korean engineers were
dispatched to be trained at French companies to gain experience with manufacturing steam
generators and reactor pressure vessels. They stayed for several months and focused on material
procurement, production, inspection and maintenance. At the same time, more than 1000 welders
were trained in South Korea in compliance with American ASME and French RCC standards
(Kwon, 1985). French professionals organized other training programs in domains such as
scheduling and metallurgy. Programs were designed to be the same as training programs for new
employees at the companies' home bases in France (Commeau, 1985).
Framatome and Alsthom also sent French experts to Korea who stayed for several years and
assisted in virtually every step along the manufacturing process, including tool procurement and
preparation, layout and sequencing of manufacturing operations, procurement of consumables,
assistance during various manufacturing stages, demonstration of welding and machining,
inspections, and assistance on documentation. This was complemented by an effort to adapt
French designs to the available quality of domestic materials, products, and machine tools and to
local industry standards as far as they applied. Michael Lemaire of Alsthom emphasized (1985)
the hands-on nature of the technology transfer process and the commitment to their partner's
success: "during the manufacturing period, we did not merely send know-how, but added a 'do-
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how' dimension to ensure quick success." The training of personnel was complemented by the
delivery of "complete and up-to-date technical information, identical to that used in our factories,
for several components and localized parts that were to be manufactured in Korea, as specified in
the agreement." This included large amounts of technical documents. Alsthom alone prepared
15,000 drawings with five revisions of each. The final issues of the transferred technical
documents packages "consisted of 75,000 drawings and about 100,000 letters, notes, memos,
etc." (Lemaire, 1985) Alain Commeau of Framatome (1985) summarized the technology transfer
process as an effort "to allow our partner to achieve independence based on our own
experience."
By the 1990s, KHIC was able to manufacture most components of both nuclear island and
conventional island equipment and became a lead supplier for Westinghouse (Interview
09142011). Today, KHIC's successor Doosan is one of the largest power equipment companies
globally, along with GE, Siemens, Alstom and ABB. In 1999, Doosan received orders from
Westinghouse for replacement steam generators in the US and the Korean company has since
made inroads into foreign nuclear power plant markets (Doosan, 2008). Doosan received more
orders from the US subsequently. In 2007, Doosan received orders from Westinghouse for
supplying major nuclear island equipment such as pressure vessels and steam generators for its
four AP 1000 reactors in China (WNN, 2008). Additionally, it received orders worth more than
$4 billion from KEPCO for four nuclear power plants in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
(Doosan, 2010). Doosan's involvement in AP 1000 reactor projects in China requires the Korean
company to provide assistance to China First Heavy Industries from whom it was required to
obtain forgings for the reactor pressure vessels it manufactured (WNN, 2011). In 2011, Doosan
signed agreements with a Westinghouse joint venture in the UK, indicating future collaboration
with Westinghouse in the UK (Power Engineering, 2011).
Doosan has thus evolved from being a recipient of nuclear technology transfer in the 1970s and
1980s to becoming a leading global power equipment supplier and an important partner of
Westinghouse, one of the companies that helped it gain its manufacturing and management
expertise in the first place. Like Framatome and Alsthom before, Doosan cannot change the rules
of international technology transfer: after having received knowhow in the past, it now finds
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itself contractually bound to assist newly emerging actors such as Chinese power equipment
companies CFHI and others.
2.3.3 Westinghouse, KEPCO and the UAE
The Korean case further illustrates how new supplier relationships emerge from former
technology transfer agreements. But it does more than that. Korea's closest partner
Westinghouse benefits from its close connections with Korea in other ways too.
Westinghouse's role in the $20 billion Korean-led UAE project illustrates the point. In fact
Westinghouse played a central role in the Korean-led consortium that won the tender. According
to Korean officials, Westinghouse received a $1.3 billion share of the UAE tender for technical
assistance and royalties (Bertheldmy and Leveque, 2011). This seems a relatively small portion
compared to the total project volume of $20 billion, the large majority of which is assigned to
Korean contractors. However, as has been pointed out by Bertheldmy and Leveque, the Korean
bid was so aggressive that margins for Korean companies must be assumed to be extremely low
or even below breakeven. Westinghouse will likely be the contractor with the highest margins
among all contractors - while not carrying any of the risk typically associated with such large
projects. In other words, South Korea's KEPCO turned out to be an excellent vehicle for
Westinghouse for its low-risk/high-return participation in a major international nuclear power
project.
Although the UAE deal is likely to lead to very low, if not negative, returns for Korea, the
country nevertheless celebrated it as a great success. South Korea had demonstrated that it was
now part of the small and exclusive group of international nuclear reactor vendors. However,
despite its progress in localization and technology development, a number of factors speak for
the continued involvement of Westinghouse both in South Korea domestically and abroad:
e Officially, South Korea strives for complete independence from foreign intellectual
property by 2012, but it is not clear how many license and cooperation agreements still
exist with foreign companies (WNA South Korea, 2012). Industry experts believe that
there are still a substantial number of them. Particularly in areas like nuclear design code,
Korea is believed to still have deficits (Berthelemy and Leveque, 2011) and in regard to
21
fuel design and manufacturing Korea relies on a joint venture with majority ownership of
Westinghouse, KW Nuclear Components (WNA South Korea, 2012).
" Westinghouse is a mature nuclear technology company with global experience and a
large knowledge base. Due to the deverticalization of Westinghouse in recent decades the
company was forced to virtually reinvent itself and focus on key strengths such as
engineering services and automation. South Korean companies can benefit from
Westinghouse's knowledge base and increasing specialization in those domains.
" Westinghouse brings a globally respected brand name and credibility to the table due to
dozens of reference projects, valuable assets for Korea to enter foreign markets. The
importance of this aspect in the UAE deal is illustrated by a comment by a UAE official
who said: "ultimately much of the [Korean] technology has a US thumbprint on it"
(McLain, 2010). South Korea benefits greatly from the credibility that comes with having
Westinghouse on board.
" Bertheldmy and Leveque point out many indicators that show that the US provided
valuable diplomatic support to the Korean bid due to the involvement of US-based
Westinghouse. To compete with diplomatic heavyweights like Russia and France and
their state-backed reactor vendors Rosatom and Areva, South Korea may be well advised
to maintain its US connections and benefit from American diplomatic support.
" In addition to design and technical assistance, Westinghouse is involved in Korea's
nuclear fuel supply. According to the US-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement of 1974,
Korea is not permitted to enrich or reprocess its own nuclear fuel and therefore, has to
buy fuel through companies like Korea Nuclear Fuel (Manyin et al., 2012). Westinghouse
has a joint venture with Korea Nuclear Fuel where it holds majority shares for the
fabrication of Control Element Assemblies (CEA), i.e. fuel elements (Westinghouse,
2009).
These are reasons that speak in favor of South Korea continuing its close relationship with
Westinghouse. At the same time, the partnership with South Korea offers unique and crucial
opportunities for Westinghouse. They are as follows:
* Westinghouse competes for nuclear reactor projects globally with large state-owned
companies like Areva of France and Rosatom of Russia. Although, as seen in the
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previous section, the US has historically supported Westinghouse in the realm of
diplomacy, even after it had been acquired by Toshiba', it cannot live up to the level of
direct state support that Areva and Rosatom enjoy. In nuclear power industry circles
companies like Areva and Rosatom are sometimes dubbed "France Inc." and "Russia
Inc." for that reason (Interview 10142011). State support is multilayered: governments
can coordinate between different actors of their nuclear industries such as utilities, reactor
vendors and equipment manufacturers. Often, governments provide subsidies to nuclear
equipment companies for building and maintaining capital intensive capacity. They can
facilitate financing of international projects by providing export credit and they can
influence bidding processes by tying large international orders to political issues.
Rosatom explicitly highlights these aspects in its promotional materials by stating that as
"a state corporation Rosatom is taking advantage of unique industry access to privilege
resources" (Samoshin, 2012). The absence of various forms of state support
commonplace in other countries has manifested itself in the US in various ways: US
nuclear reactor vendors suffer from the lack of coordination among the large number of
different utilities in the US. Large forging capacity necessary for the manufacturing of
major nuclear power equipment did not remain competitive in the hands of private
companies as new builds were stalled. In turn, its close relationship with South Korea's
KEPCO helps Westinghouse to benefit from the type of state support it would otherwise
be lacking, state support that has become crucial in competing with state-owned
competitors Areva and Rosatom. The Korean government coordinates between different
actors of its nuclear industry, promotes the industry's overall development and supports
Korean bids for nuclear power projects abroad. The Korean Export Import Bank
(KEXIM), for instance, will provide up to $10 billion to the UAE to finance the nuclear
plant order (Daya, 2010).
In the absence of new nuclear plant orders through much of the 1980s and 1990s, Westinghouse underwent a series
of reorganizations. In 1999, the originally American company was bought by British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL)
and renamed to Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC). Soon after, the ABB Group's nuclear power sector was
merged into Westinghouse. In 2006, BNFL sold Westinghouse to Toshiba and WEC has since been a part of the
Japanese conglomerate. Nevertheless, WEC's headquarters and the majority of its employees are still based on their
original locations in the US. Therefore, WEC is still regarded to be an "American company" by some and it received
diplomatic support by representatives of the US government in the UAE bid (Bertheldmy and Leveque, 2011). In
this thesis, I refer to the original Westinghoyse as well as to WEC simply as Westinghouse.
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" A decisive factor that led to Korea's success in the UAE bid was the low cost of its
reactors. Bertheldmy and Leveque estimated the overnight cost of the Korean UAE
reactors at less than 2930 USD/kWe, which is significantly lower than Areva's EPR
reference plant at Flamanville whose overnight cost EDF reported at 3860 USD/kWe
(IEA, 2010). The GE-Hitachi offer was reported to be even higher. It was, therefore, of
great benefit to Westinghouse to have a partner like Korea that allowed them to compete
in a lower cost segment of the nuclear reactor market such as the UAE where cost may
have been a higher priority than reactor design as such.
" Another important factor in the UAE tender was the credibility of the contractor's claim
to deliver the project on time. In this regard, South Korea had an excellent record with six
Korean nuclear power plants commissioned during the ten years before the tender and
remarkably short construction periods with few delays (WNA South Korea, 2012).
Westinghouse was able to capitalize on that experience.
The KEPCO-Westinghouse partnership has been a relationship that offers benefits to both sides.
One may justly argue whether Westinghouse could have possibly anticipated these benefits when
it first transferred technology to South Korea in the 1970s. However, I believe this argument
would miss the point. As we have seen from the statements of Westinghouse representatives in
1985, Westinghouse clearly recognized future benefits of its technology partnerships in a generic
sense. While the concrete manifestations of such benefits could hardly be known in the 1970s,
Westinghouse's close relationship to the South Korean nuclear industry is not coincidental and
rooted in its earlier interactions.
2.4 Localization today
The prominence and scope of localization and technology transfer has not diminished in recent
decades. Today's nuclear reactor vendors still offer comprehensive technology transfer packages
when competing for new reactor projects, particularly in countries that aspire to build nuclear
fleets or nuclear industries of their own.
Nuclear reactor vendors do not tire of pointing out their companies' technology transfer and
localization track record. In a brochure, Areva claims that it "embraced 'localization' long before
the word became fashionable in business circles" (Areva, 2012). Similarly, Westinghouse VP
Tim Collier (Yuan, 2012) stated that "Westinghouse has a track record of technology transfers
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and localization that is unsurpassed around the world as evidenced by the long-term relationships
we have built in places like France, Japan, Korea and other countries that have embraced nuclear
energy. We are achieving the same results in China with all-round technology transfers."
Rosatom claims that "localization is an inevitable part of Rosatom policy." It wants to "establish
multiple alliances and partnerships with global and local players" and "source, develop and
transfer technologies to maintain global leadership." The Russian reactor vendors wants to
"benefit from global talents and local workforce" (Kouklik, 2012; Samoshin, 2012).
Areva, often together with its partner EDF, organizes road shows, exhibitions and seminars to
inform governments and local firms about possibilities and conditions for becoming suppliers to
nuclear power plant projects (Interview 10182011). In recent years, Areva held such events in
countries like South Africa, the United Kingdom and Poland. In each country where Areva
reactors are currently deployed or may be deployed in the future, Areva screens potential
suppliers to add them to its list of qualified and approved suppliers. Currently, 36 Finnish
companies are validated as approved vendors for safety-critical components and more Finnish
companies for non-safety-critical components. 22 companies have been qualified in the UK with
38 prequalified and 3 in Poland with 21 prequalified (De Guio and Robin, 2012). In its
presentations, Areva emphasizes that technology transfer can span from the localization of less
demanding tasks all the way to full self-reliance, usually depending on the scope of nuclear
expansion and on ambitions of local governments and industry. A schedule that lays out a
hypothetical path to full self-reliance with major milestones along the way is presented in Fig. 1,
illustrated by the case of South Africa whose Department of Trade and Industry requested
"identification of sequentially increasing domestic manufacturing opportunities" and "long term
procurement plans" (ESEC, 2010).
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Fig. 1: Potential localization schedule for South African
nuclear power program (De Guio and Robin, 2012)
Similarly, Westinghouse has been working actively to build "broader, more localized supply
chains" (Bull, 2010). This involves "supplier development activities" that attract potential local
suppliers and educate them about Westinghouse's supply chain opportunities as well as supplier
screening and qualification procedures. In line with its slogan "we buy where we build,"
Westinghouse promotes itself in the context of upcoming and ongoing nuclear tenders as a
partner that can not only deliver a state-of-the-art nuclear power plant but also benefit the local
economy. In the UK, Westinghouse claims that "UK industry could supply 70-80% of the value
of a UK nuclear program" which in sum could make a new nuclear program in the UK lead to
"potential 30 billion pounds value to the UK economy" the majority of which would come from
local supply chain development. In this context, Westinghouse uses the claim to be "committed
to technology transfer with a successful track record" as an important selling point (Patel, 2008).
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Like Areva, Westinghouse also differentiates between different levels of involvement of local
industry with the scope of the nuclear program as the main criteria. Major categories include the
involvement of local industry through "minimum development/investment" such as construction
labor and construction commodities, "medium development/investment" such as off-the-shelf
commercial equipment and build-to-spec non-safety equipment, and "maximum
development/investment" such as qualified safety-related equipment with license agreements and
technology transfer. The latter is "usually only viable for national fleet aspirations." Generally,
the development of a local supply chain is "phased-in over time based on development of skills
and investment" (Patel, 2008).
Rosatom too courts potential customers with promises to localize large parts of expected nuclear
power plant projects and to develop local supply bases. In South Africa, Rosatom estimates that
it could enable the creation of "15,000 jobs in peak (8,000 in average)" for the South African
economy as well as $15 billion in revenue for South African companies (Kouklik,
2012). The Russian nuclear reactor vendor estimates that South Africa can provide about 40% of
the value of the nuclear power plants to be built, mainly in domains like construction, electrical
devices, instrumentation and control, piping and air-conditioning. In the Czech Republic,
Rosatom envisions up to 70% local participation. As of April 2012, Rosatom identified 54
potential suppliers in the Czech Republic of which 20 have already received approval. Rosatom
tries to attract potential suppliers by offering "access to its global supplier network" and the
"opportunity to expand globally by participating in Rosatom nuclear power plant construction
projects worldwide" (Tomicek, 2011). In its advertising materials, the company points out that it
plans to build 80 nuclear power plants around the globe by 2030 and therefore offers new
members of its global supply chain "stable deliveries for other nuclear power plants in third
countries" (Tomicek, 2011).
In this section, I showed how, as before, technology transfer and localization still play major
roles for nuclear reactor vendors in the process of securing nuclear reactor projects. In this light,
the involvement of and technology transfer to Chinese companies in the context of nuclear power
plant projects in China, even to the degree of "maximum development," do not seem to exceed
the industry's common practices.
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2.5 Localization payoffs
Just as the partnership between KEPCO and Westinghouse led to an offer to the UAE that was
stronger than anything each company on its own could have provided, new alliances form over
other nuclear tenders in the world. In the UK, which plans to build some 19 GWe of new nuclear
capacity, Areva and Westinghouse have been competing with their EPR and AP 1000 reactor
designs for the 6 GW Horizon project. The energy company Horizon went on sale after German
utilities RWE and E.ON withdrew from the project. The new owner of Horizon will have an
influence on the reactor designs that will be chosen for the nuclear reactor development sites the
company owns. In June 2012, Reuters reported that Areva teamed up with its partner China
Guangdong Nuclear (CGN) and Westinghouse with its partner SNPTC to bid for Horizon (Xu
and Schaps, 2012) A third bidder is believed to be GE-Hitachi. In this context, both Areva and
Westinghouse benefit from their respective relationships with Chinese partners that are the
products of years, in the case of Westinghouse and SNPTC, and decades, in the case of Areva
and CGN, of technology transfer and other forms of collaboration. The Chinese state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) will be able to support their Western partners financially as they are well
equipped with capital and backed by Chinese central and provincial governments which have
interests in getting a foot in the door of nuclear power markets abroad. Additionally, the Chinese
companies may bring Chinese subcontractors to the project such as the nuclear construction
company China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation (CNEC) and procure equipment
from proven Chinese suppliers (Interview 10182011). This way, Areva and Westinghouse could
benefit from the experience Chinese players have built up and from unique features of the
Chinese nuclear power ecosystem that arguably lead to low cost products at acceptable quality.
In turn, partnerships with companies like Areva and Westinghouse help Chinese companies to
gain more credibility and to overcome political and public resistance. As another step to
overcome potential resistance, Chinese companies agreed to bring in UK utility firms for the
operation of the plants (Macalister and Harvey, 2012).
Chinese subcontractors play important roles in the ongoing construction of Areva's EPR and
Westinghouse's AP1000 reactors in China as I discuss in more detail in later parts of this thesis.
They are now familiar with their Western partners' designs and management styles. Moreover,
companies like CNEC have an excellent track record of delivering projects in time and on budget
and the quality of their work can be observed in real time as they are involved in multiple
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ongoing projects. These can be valuable factors contributing to the bidders' success in nuclear
projects in the UK. In contrast, GE-Hitachi which does not have a major Chinese partner will
have to find ways to compensate on these fronts.
Analogous to the partnership between Westinghouse and KEPCO with its various subsidiaries,
we see new partnerships forming between major nuclear power companies that have developed
their relationships over years and decades, usually involving technology transfer and knowledge
exchange. We can observe how companies capitalize on these relationships over time, most
explicitly by forming partnerships to benefit from each other's strengths and compensate for
each other's weaknesses. In a time that is characterized by deverticalization and modularization
of at least some of the global nuclear power industry, as described in the following chapter, the
capability to do so becomes increasingly important. This makes successful and strategic
technology transfer and the creation of potential future partners all the more important.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, I showed that comprehensive technology transfer has been characteristic of the
global nuclear industry from its beginnings. Not only did technology transfer become common
practice due to political impulses such as the Atoms for Peace program and the bargaining of
demand for technology by developing economies, but it also served nuclear vendors as a vehicle
for entering new partnerships, creating future markets and developing new suppliers. As the case
of Westinghouse and South Korea illustrates, such partnerships can equip companies with crucial
competitive advantages and can allow them to benefit from particular features of their partners'
nuclear industry ecosystems. In addition, successful technology transfer cases create a track
record much desired by countries that are planning new nuclear power plant projects. Successful
references of technology transfer in the past, credibility to successfully and sustainably involve
local suppliers in nuclear supply chains, and the ability to create and maintain pools of suppliers
in different countries are factors that influence the competitiveness of contemporary nuclear
power plant vendors.
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PART II - DEVERTICALIZATION AND INTEGRATION - TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
After analyzing common practices in the history of the nuclear industry in regard to technology
transfer and localization, I discuss in this second part of this thesis global trends that shape the
industry today. I find divergent trends in the nuclear industry that affect different parts of the
global industry simultaneously: a trend toward greater deverticalization and another trend toward
greater integration. In the following paragraphs I discuss how these trends manifest themselves
in view of organization and product architectures. I argue that understanding these trends is
essential for assessing China's current and future role in the global nuclear industry.
I begin by briefly analyzing the nuclear supply chain and by identifying major tasks and
components. I then turn to the case of Areva's Olkiluoto nuclear power plant project to illustrate
organizational challenges as they are faced by contemporary nuclear industry actors. I then
discuss how concepts of modularity apply to the nuclear industry and the impact of higher and
lower degrees of modularity on innovation and corporate strategy. Finally, I point to the
implications of the discussed topics for the Chinese nuclear industry and its possible roles vis-A-
vis other players.
3 Value in the nuclear supply chain
3.1 Introduction
Nuclear power plant projects are among the most complex and costly engineering projects of our
time. Activities and inputs required for building nuclear power plants range from design and
engineering services, to project management and construction oversight; from construction itself
to the supply of various types of mechanical, electrical and instrumentation and control
equipment; from installation and commissioning to operation and maintenance. The different
areas require a broad range of expertise and no single corporation is able to build a nuclear
power plant entirely on its own. Tasks are spread across a nuclear supply chain, or rather a
supply network consisting of multiple supply chains.
In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of major activities and components that are part of
nuclear power plant projects and their position in the nuclear value chain. This may help the
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reader to put the questions of later chapters into perspective - questions concerning product and
organization architectures, innovation and corporate strategy as far as they affect the nuclear
industry. For the purpose of this thesis, the term "nuclear industry" is synonymous with activities
and components spanning the nuclear value chain as presented in this chapter.
3.2 Cost of nuclear power plant projects
Cost estimates of power plants are often given as so called overnight costs. Overnight costs of a
nuclear power plant consist of "bare plant costs" which include engineering, procurement and
construction costs, and "owner's costs" which include the cost of land, cooling infrastructure,
administration and associated buildings, etc. The final total costs incurred by the owner of a plant
are a combination of the overnight costs and time-related costs, including inflation and the cost
of the capital required to finance plant construction.
Overnight costs are often expressed in US dollars per kW of installed capacity for ease of
comparison between different plant types. Scaling that value by the total installed capacity of a
plant results in a cost estimate for the entire plant. A compilation of reported overnight cost
estimates by the World Nuclear Association in Table 2 provides an initial indication of the order
of magnitude of nuclear power plant costs. As can be seen from the table, the 2010 estimates
vary widely from $1556/kW in South Korea to $5863/kW in Switzerland. Numbers in Asian
markets are considered most reliable as countries such as China and South Korea have actually
built nuclear power plants in recent years and numbers can be based on empirical records rather
than models. For the purpose of this thesis and for the calculation of percentages of component
costs, I assume an average 1000 MWe nuclear power plants to have overnight costs between $3
billion and $4 billion in 2010 dollars, using recent Chinese plants as reference.
The Chinese government's plans to build 200 reactors by 2030 and the Korean government's
plans to build 80 reactors by 2030, give a sense of the size of these countries' nuclear programs
(WNA China, 2012 and WNA South Korea, 2012). The estimates of the IAEA in late 2011 for
total growth of nuclear reactors globally by 2030 amount from 190 as a low case scenario to 350
as a high case scenario (Sarnsamak, 2011). These estimates would translate into a global market
for nuclear power plants ranging from at least $570 billion to $1,050 billion.
31
Table 2: Overnight costs in 2010 dollars as quoted in WNA 2012 based on IEA 2010
3.2.1 Financing costs
Financing costs vary and depend on interest rates. Bertheldmy and Leveque (2011) determined
that financing costs for an EPR reactor as built at Flamanville in France amount to approximately
$620 million if the cost of capital is 5% and $1.360 billion if the cost of capital is 10%.
Compared to the estimated overnight cost of $3860/kWe this would amount to capital costs of
16% and 35% respectively. Other sources report that actual financing costs for most nuclear
power plants lie between 25 and 30% of the final cost (i.e. overnight cost and capital cost)
(WNA Econ, 2012).
3.2.2 Overnight costs
A wide range of products and services are included in the overnight cost of nuclear power plants.
The Code of Accounts of the Energy Economic Data Base (EEDB) is commonly used for
categorizing and structuring the various types of costs (Delene and Hudson, 1990). In this system,
all costs are divided into less than a dozen main categories among which are "Capitalized
Indirect Services Cost" that include "Engineering and design, project management" and
"Buildings and structures, construction and commissioning" as well as "Capitalized Direct
Costs" that include "Reactor plant equipment," "Turbine generator plant equipment" and
"Balance of Plant" These two categories represent by far the greatest portion of overnight costs.
Significant types of costs that are not included here are owner's costs which include the cost of
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Overnight cost Reactor type and location
estimate (2010)
$1556/kW APR-1400 in South Korea
$3009/ kW ABWR in Japan
$3382/kW Gen III+ in USA
$3860/kW EPR in France
$5863/kW EPR in Switzerland
$1748/kW CPR-1000 in China
$2302/kW AP1000 in China
$2933/kW VVER- 1150 in Russia
land and the cost of licensing. Safety analysis, however, is part of "Capitalized Indirect Services
Cost."
3 - Capitalized Indirect SerAces Cost (CIC)
Sun 25%
ALMR 22%
Betefonte 22%
Engineering and design, o t management
Sun 17%
ALMR 16%
Beiefonte 15%
Construction and commissioning
Sun 8%
At.MR 6%
Belefonte 7%
4 Financial cost, tax, insurances, contimgencies irst fuel
Sun 25%
ALMR 25%
Belefonte 25%
Fig. 2: Cost estimates for nuclear power plants by category from three different sources
labeled as (1) Sun (2) ALMR (3) Bellefonte
Fig. 2 contains cost estimates from three different sources across the most basic Code of Account
categories. Each category includes the costs of all required products and services including
construction, installation and other labor costs. The sources used are (1) a paper on the economic
potential of modular nuclear reactors by Tsinghua University's INET which involves a
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comparison of the costs of modular nuclear reactors with a typical Chinese 1000 MWe PWR
whose numbers I used (Zhang and Sun, 2007); (2) cost estimates for the DOE's ALMR program
from "1994 Capital and Busbar Cost Estimates" (Gokcek et al., 1995) (3) a report by the
Tennessee Valley Authority with cost estimates for an 1371 MWe ABWR at their Bellefonte site
in Alabama (TVA, 2005).
The reactors referenced are different designs and were built at different times. Nevertheless,
there is a large degree of coherence, except for the equipment category. This has partly to do
with the different reactor architectures, but it also has to do with different ways of allocating
equipment to respective categories (e.g. certain pumps could be counted either as reactor plant
equipment or as balance of plant). For the purposes of this thesis, a first approximation is
sufficient. For Fig. 3 illustrating the distribution of costs, I used the mean values of each Code of
Account category. Furthermore, I simplified the categories into "design and project
management," "construction and installation" as well as "equipment and materials."
Approximation of relative distribution of nuclear power plant
overnight cost
m design and project management
% construction and installation
* equipment and materials
M financial cost and fees
Fig. 3: Approximation of relative distribution of nuclear power plant overnight cost
The largest category is equipment and materials which I divide into further subcategories
"commodity materials," "key equipment" and "non-key equipment." In the following sections I
describe each category in more detail.
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3.2.2.1 Design and project management
The design of nuclear power plants encompasses conceptual design as well as detailed design.
Conceptual design involves the layout of the reactor core based on physical principles, the choice
of materials such as fuel and coolant materials and related choices for build materials and plant
architecture, as well as safety assessments and the development of safety mechanisms. A
conceptual design may be represented by diagrams, drawings and computer models,
accompanied by calculations and explanations. Since conceptual designs do not contain
sufficient instructions for engineers and workers on a building site, the abstract conceptual
design needs to be broken down into work packages that can be described in detail and can
eventually be scheduled. Required equipment and inputs need to be identified and detailed
drawings created that illustrate exact dimensions and locations of all components. The latter is
generally called detailed design. Many conceptual designs for nuclear reactors are heavily
informed by research at universities and labs as well as accumulated experience with previous
designs. Detailed design is often carried out by design institutes or in-house detailed design
departments of nuclear reactor vendor companies.
Project management teams have to interact closely with design teams as they take designs and,
through scheduling, turn them into sequences. Experienced engineers determine the order in
which various construction tasks need to be executed, taking into account the interdependence of
different tasks and constraints such as space, labor, delivery of equipment, etc. A central aspect
of project management is quality control. This spans from the screening of suppliers and the
procurement of equipment to the provision of training to workers on site, inspection procedures
and documentation. Project management functions are usually shared across a number of actors,
often between the reactor designer and an architect-engineering firm. In some cases, the utility
that acts as an owner has developed these capabilities, as in the case of France's EDF or Korea's
KEPCO. In other cases, a nuclear reactor vendor may involve an experienced architect-
engineering firm. Examples for such configurations are Westinghouse and Shaw or GE and
Bechtel.
3.2.2.2 Construction
Construction in nuclear power plant projects involves both civil works and installation. Many of
the tasks involved in construction barely differ from those at other large construction projects
and can be executed by conventional construction firms (IAEA, 2009). Major capabilities of
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construction firms involve welding, the pouring of concrete, as well as the transportation and
installation of equipment. The biggest difference between nuclear power plants and other large
construction projects are in project management functions as laid out above. Documentation
plays a central role in this context: both written instructions for executing tasks and required
documentation on already executed tasks is generally more detailed compared to construction
projects in other sectors.
3.2.2.3 Equipment and materials
Equipment ranges from small off-the-shelf valves to vast machined forgings, from conventional
Portland cement to specialized alloys, and from kilometers of plain cable to complex digital
control systems. The spectrum is wide in terms of complexity, cost, and degrees of specialization.
With equipment and materials making up the largest portion of the cost of a nuclear power plant,
I introduce the categories "commodity materials," "key equipment" and "non-key equipment" to
differentiate between various kinds of equipment.
The most common commodity materials are concrete and rebar. In most cases, there are no
special requirements for concrete and rebar used in nuclear plant projects. They are provided by
large organizations like steel and concrete mills who also supply similar commodity materials to
other sectors. 1000 MWe sized light water reactor designs tend to require about 200 cubic meter
of concrete per installed MWe (Peterson, 2005). Based on concrete prices of 2007 this translates
into material costs for concrete at roughly 1% of the total plant cost or roughly 2% of the total
equipment and materials cost. The amount of steel needed for a nuclear power plant has been
estimated at around 40 metric tons per installed MWe. Based on steel prices of $660 per metric
ton in 2007 (Mathews and Jolis, 2007), this also roughly translates into 1% of total plant cost
estimates or about 2% of equipment and materials cost.
Key equipment consists of discrete items that perform key functions in the operations of nuclear
power plants. These contribute to the bulk of total plant cost. They are often featured
prominently in localization reports and promotion programs and their localization commonly
serves as a benchmark of industry capability. This type of equipment is usually tailored to the
nuclear power industry and their production requires specific manufacturing equipment and
training. The following components are generally regarded as key equipment both in regard to
their function and cost. In parenthesis are percentages taken from a Deutsche Bank report on
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China Power Equipment (Tong, 2010) that estimates the value of these components in relation to
the total cost of nuclear power plant equipment: steam generators (8%), reactor pressure
vessel/containment vessel (11%), pressurizer (1%), reactor vessel internals (3%), control rod
drive mechanism (2%), reactor coolant pumps (4%), turbine (7%), and generator (6%). As for
projects in China, prices for these components tend to lie between CNY 50 million (48 million)
and CNY 700 million (~$110 million). The functional relationship of different kinds of key
equipment is depicted in Fig. 4.
Containment Structure
Pressurizer Steam
Generator
Fig. 4: Schematic of fundamental nuclear power plant components (NRC, 2012)
Despite key equipment representing a range of discrete and high valued components, even the
sum of the cost of all key equipment as defined above contributes only about 42% of the total
equipment cost of a nuclear power plant. The balance is take up by what I call non-key
equipment, as discussed in the following section.
Most suppliers to nuclear power plant projects are neither commodity nor key equipment
suppliers. In order to install, connect, monitor, and operate key equipment and ensure normal
power plant functioning, additional types of equipment are necessary, the sum of which I define
as non-key equipment. This includes a wide range of disparate products such as pipes and valves,
pumps, tanks, vessels, cranes, motors, instrumentation, simulators, software for design and
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project management, and many others. These components are extremely heterogeneous and the
one thing they have in common is their small portion of the total cost of a nuclear power plant,
with orders usually amounting to less than $10 million. The large number of different kinds of
non-key equipment still makes this heterogeneous category very significant.
Non-key equipment can include both nuclear industry specific equipment and off-the-shelf
equipment that is also used in other industries, for instance coal, oil and gas, petrochemical, rail
industries. Many companies that supply non-key equipment are not purely nuclear industry
companies since they participate in and are affected by other major industries as well.
3.2.3 Organizational chart
After discussing the distribution of value across nuclear power plant building projects so far, I
bring this section to a close by illustrating the organizational hierarchy within which different
actors across the value chain operate. Fig. 5 represents an organizational chart of a typical
nuclear power plant project as employed by US nuclear reactor vendor Westinghouse. Using the
categories defined above, design and project management activities tend to be centralized around
the "Plant designer" and the "Architect/Engineer" which sometimes consist of a single entity and
sometimes of separate entities. Construction activities tend to be coordinated by the "Civil
Constructor" who in turn draws upon its own network of subcontractors. Producers of key
equipment fall into the categories "NSSS Supplier" and "BOP Supplier" while non-key
equipment and commodity materials tend to fall under "Tier 2 & 3 Suppliers."
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Fig. 5: Organizational chart for nuclear power plant projects
as viewed by Rolls-Royce (Molyneux, 2008)
3.3 Summary
In this chapter I showed that the total cost of nuclear power plants is distributed across a wide
range of products and services. Even a small share in the pie of a nuclear power plant project can
lead to substantial revenues, given the large size of the pie. Components include industry-
specific equipment as well as common commodities and off-the-shelf products. Similarly, some
services are specifically tailored to unique nuclear industry characteristics while others are just
slightly adapted to nuclear power conditions. This makes for a complex and diverse nuclear
value chain, involving small and large companies, low and high technologies, commodity and
niche products.
4 The nuclear value chain in action: organizational challenges as exemplified by the case of
Olkiluoto
4.1 Introduction
After introducing various tasks across the nuclear supply chain, this section presents the
dynamics that underlies nuclear power plant projects and the unique challenges posed by the
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complex division of labor, the coordination of numerous actors, and the special requirements of
the nuclear sector.
Much of the modem nuclear industry is still affected by the drop in nuclear development
following the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl accidents in the 1970s and 1980s. Following
these events, many companies turned their backs on the nuclear sector due to a lack of new
orders and a negative outlook. Consequently, skills, experience and facilities faded over time
(Aalto University, 2010). This coincided with a general trend in many industries towards
deverticalization and outsourcing. Some of the large integrated organizations of the nuclear
industry became leaner while supply chains became longer and more complex. I describe this
process in more detail in the following chapter. In addition, reactor designs changed. More
advanced reactor core designs, digital automation and new construction techniques made nuclear
reactors more efficient and safer. However, many of these improvements were developed in
engineering offices and had not yet been tested in the field.
4.2 The case of Olkiluoto
Contemporary challenges and characteristics of nuclear power plant building projects are
exemplified by the construction of a reactor that is based on the first new reactor design in
Europe since the 1980s: Areva's EPR which is built in Olkiluoto, Finland. The EPR in Olkiluoto
is a 1600 MWe nuclear reactor that was developed by Areva based on earlier designs of reactors
built in France and Germany but with enhanced safety features. The reactor was sold to Finland
on the basis of a turnkey contract under which the reactor vendor carries responsibility and
intrinsic risk for the project. Areva collaborates with the German engineering company Siemens
on the turbine island and with the French construction company Bouygues on civil works as well
as with many subcontractors on other aspects of the project (Areva, 2012). The total number of
subcontractors that Areva needs to coordinate is over 1,900. Among those, about 40% are
Finnish companies, to exploit the advantages of propinquity and in fulfillment of localization
requests; the remaining companies come from 28 different countries. At the peak of construction
activities about 4,500 workers were on site, representing 66 different nationalities - numbers that
illustrate the management challenge of the project (Aalto University, 2010).
Construction at the Olkiluoto site commenced in August 2005 and the plant was initially
scheduled to come online in 2009, with total estimated costs of Euro 3.7 billion (WNN, 2012).
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However, the project suffered several delays and in 2012 the plant is still not operating with
2014 as a new target. As of 2010, cost overruns were estimated to exceed Euro 2.7 billion (Brett,
2010). The reasons for the delays are manifold but most can be traced back to unique challenges
of the nuclear industry in regard to the management of complex multi-firm networks. The
following list provides a summary of problems, as identified by a Case study of Aalto University
(2010), which illustrate this aspect:
e Responsibilities for decision-making as well as for providing training programs and
inspection services were not clear. For instance, it was not clearly defined which party
was responsible for determining the exact composition of concrete. Consequently, large
parts of concrete had to be remade due to non-conformance with quality requirements.
e The transfer of documents among organizations was unsystematic.
" The design work was inadequate and many required designs were not ready prior to the
start of construction. The time required for finalizing detailed designs was underestimated.
" Project managers were not on site in Finland but at their companies' headquarters in
France.
" Because of insufficient quality, recasting of all eight reactor coolant pipes became
necessary.
" Welding and metal work on the containment steel liner was unauthorized and insufficient.
* The automation system design was not adequately documented according to regulatory
requirements.
* Concrete ingredients lacked the required traceability.
" Safety culture training was not provided as required.
" A subcontractor's design office was in India where engineers failed to take into account
local conditions that are unique due to the Finnish climate.
These points can be roughly summarized into: (1) inexperience of the main contractor in
managing large construction projects; (2) inexperience of the subcontractors and lack of nuclear-
industry related skills; and (3) lack of knowledge about local conditions and regulations.
The problems manifested themselves in a poor flow of information, both from contractors to
subcontractors, e.g. for delivering instructions, and from subcontractors to contractors e.g. for
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reporting abnormalities. The electronic systems for exchanging information were insufficient. In
addition, the range of different languages among workers led to frequent miscommunication. The
communication challenge was exacerbated by the fact that large numbers of Polish workers were
hired as they were significantly cheaper than their Finnish counterparts. Hierarchies and
responsibilities were not clearly defined such that certain types of instructions and training were
not provided as they fell through the cracks. This was particularly problematic since the stringent
quality requirements of the nuclear industry were not internalized by every subcontractor,
especially since many companies had had no previous experience with nuclear construction
projects. Finally, the importance of involving local firms for their knowledge of local regulations,
laws and procedures such as the approval of documentation ahead of construction was
underestimated and foreign companies often had to learn about Finnish conditions as they were
making mistakes.
Despite its decades-long experience and its involvement in more than 100 nuclear reactor
projects in the past, the French reactor vendor Areva found itself in an unfamiliar situation.
While for past reactor construction projects it could rely on a close long-term partnership with
experienced French architect engineer EDF, EDF did not participate in the Olkiluoto project.
Consequently, Areva took on the role of architect-engineer itself, with the support of other
construction companies that it had little experience with. The numerous delays and mistakes
during the construction of the reactor also reflect Areva's lack of experience in procurement and
the management of subcontractors. The fact that many subcontractors had no nuclear experience
made matters worse.
4.3 Summary
The Olkiluoto case illustrates the challenges of nuclear power plant construction projects by
revealing what can go wrong. The nuclear power industry has particularly high requirements on
complying with well-defined quality standards and implementing appropriate quality assurance
systems. Documentation and the traceability of each step along the production process are central.
The complexity of nuclear power projects requires clear structures and ease of communication
across the multiple interfaces of different suppliers. This challenge is exacerbated by the number
of suppliers, the diversity and internationality of suppliers, and the maturity and volatility of
supplier relationships. The case also stresses the importance of adapting to local conditions. This
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ranges from project management challenges as laid out to physical conditions such as different
climates and different materials and to local regulations and laws. Retaining knowledge and
learning within the organization or across networks, effective systems integration, building and
managing functional, reliable supplier networks, and the ability to adapt to local conditions
emerge as crucial challenges for contemporary nuclear industries.
In the next section, I show how such unique features of the nuclear industry affect organization
architectures and product architectures. Today, we find different organization and product
architectures among different firms in the global nuclear industry. Each architecture poses
particular advantages and disadvantages in dealing with challenges such as those presented
above.
5 Global nuclear power supply chains - modular and integrated organizations and
networks
5.1 Introduction
As seen in previous chapters, nuclear power plant value chains are vast in scope and complexity
and require numerous products and services. Nuclear power plants fit the definition of complex
product systems, as employed by Hobday et al. (2005). Effective coordination between different
providers of products and services is crucial. The sums of all actors that contribute to complex
product systems have been called production networks.
Sturgeon (2002, 2003) has studied production networks extensively and distinguishes between
relational and modular production networks, drawing on the concept of modularity which is
characteristic of many complex production systems, including automotive, computer and
aerospace industries. The concepts of modularity and production networks are closely linked to
systems integration. Systems integration in the widest sense encompasses the creation and
coordination of production networks with the goal of turning designs into products.
In this chapter, I elaborate on the nature of modularity and systems integration in the global
nuclear industry and trace how the industry has changed in regard to those concepts over recent
decades. This includes discussing the implications of modularity and systems integration for
organization architectures and product architectures, innovation and corporate strategy.
Analyzing the role of modularity in today's global nuclear industry contributes to understanding
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the environment into which the developing Chinese nuclear industry is growing and the role that
Chinese actors can play in this environment.
5.2 Definition of terms
5.2.1 Modular and relational production networks
In the 1980s and 1990s, modularity and systems integration became established concepts to
describe the organization of complex manufacturing industries and their products (Prencipe,
2003). The increased complexity of products and the divide-and-conquer approach employed to
break product systems into simpler subsystems led to suppliers specializing in individual
components. Simultaneously, improvements in information and communications technology
(ICT) greatly facilitated the codification and exchange of knowledge which led to the
standardization of products and interfaces and decreased spatial dependence among those
responsible for different subsystems. The internet, computer aided design (CAD), automated
manufacturing systems, as well as design, testing and building software fueled this trend (Pavitt,
2003). The standardization of components and the advances in ICT facilitated the allocation of
tasks to other organizational units, also known as outsourcing. This offered firms the opportunity
to capture value "from vertical dis-integration of a modular sort" by achieving lower costs for
outsourced tasks due to greater specialization and competition and greater flexibility in regard to
capacity (Sako, 2005). The resulting networks were called modular production networks by
Sturgeon (2002). According to Sturgeon, modular production networks are characterized by their
dynamic nature which depends on the substitutability of individual suppliers due to the codified
and standardized nature of each component.
Modular production networks contrast to relational production networks. In the latter, lead firms
and suppliers have more stable, sometimes exclusive relationships, often aided by social and
spatial propinquity as in industrial districts (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The close relationships
between organizations can lead to greater efficiency, especially if processes with feedback and
interdependencies are involved, but they can also lead to captive production networks, i.e.
existential dependence of one partner on another. In relational production networks, product and
process specifications remain relatively tacit which leads to greater asset specificity than in the
inter-firm relationship.
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5.2.2 Systems integration
The ability to coordinate modular and relational production networks has been called systems
integration and identified as a core capability of modern corporations by Hobday et al (2005).
Systems integration involves a range of tasks affecting corporate strategy, project management,
procurement, quality control and other divisions of firms. The central tasks include: (1) deciding
to what degree a product can be and shall be produced in an integrated or in a modular manner;
(2) decomposing a product and allocating its subsystems, i.e. modules, to either internal or
external organizations; (3) choosing suitable external partners and apportioning production and
innovation tasks across the value stream; (4) recomposing and delivering the final product from
the various subsystems; (5) monitoring the production process in regard to quality and cost and
avoiding changes and delays; (6) processing and evaluating feedback to optimize product and
production.
The last two points have a particularly high significance in the nuclear industry, as design
changes and quality shortcomings can lead to safety hazards and costly delays. The list also
indicates how technology transfer and localization decisions impact systems integration as they
create new opportunities for partnerships.
5.3 Modularity in the nuclear power industry
In this section, I discuss how characteristic features of the nuclear power industry lead to the
promotion of either modular or relational supplier relationships.
5.3.1 Definition of modularity
The decomposition of complex systems into subsystems and the integration into final products
requires the definition of interfaces between subsystems. Therefore, analyzing the nature of
interfaces becomes a necessary precondition for analyzing the potential for modularity in an
industry (Sako, 2005). Most scholars agree that the more standardized and clearly defined the
interfaces are between subsystems, the more the system will allow for modularity.
Modularity in nuclear power supply chains is defined in this thesis as the ability to source
components of modular designs from a larger pool of suppliers compared to components of non-
modular designs. Substitutability among modular supply chain elements allows for mixing and
matching of similar components from different suppliers. This is made possible by standardized
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and codified interfaces. Lastly, this definition of modularity implies elements of modular supply
chains to be largely self-contained. Sako (2005) defined a module as "a set of components
assembled, which can be checked and tested before final assembly." Thus, a buyer has to be able
to rely on the functionality and quality of a sourced component for the product to be truly
modular. With this definition in mind, I investigate which characteristics of the nuclear power
industry pertain to that type of modularity in supply chains and which characteristics tend to
limit it.
5.3.2 Characteristics of the nuclear power industry that relate to modularity
The product system of a nuclear power plant has numerous interfaces, both on a product level
between components, e.g. between a steam generator and a reactor pressure vessel or between a
valve and a pipe, and on an organizational level between companies, e.g. between installation
firms and equipment manufacturers or between construction contractors and architect-engineers.
Rather than listing and discussing individual interfaces at this point, I highlight common
characteristics of the nuclear power industry that affect most interfaces between nuclear power
industry subsystems. I distinguish between features that are susceptible to modularity and those
which are not, beginning with the latter:
(1) Different national quality standards
Nuclear power plant construction and equipment manufacturing in all countries with
operating nuclear power plants have to comply with national construction laws and
quality standards. In addition to general legislation that applies to conventional industries
like the construction industry as a whole, the nuclear power industry in most countries
also has to comply with specific requirements of government agencies tailored to the
unique demands of nuclear power plant environments. Historically, regulators and
inspection organizations in different countries have had different emphases in this
process and different national standards have evolved. In the US, for instance, nuclear
power plant equipment manufacturing has to comply with standards set forth by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) whereas in France Regles de
Conception et de Construction des Materiels Mecaniques des Ilots Nucleaires PWR
(RCC-M) standards apply.
46
When nuclear power plants are built overseas according to US or French designs, the
most economical option is usually to follow the national standards that were used in the
plants' home markets. In some countries this is even required by local law. French-
designed nuclear power plants in China, Russian-designed plants in China and US-
designed plants in China are all built to different national standards: French, Russian and
American respectively. Many equipment suppliers only own one set of certificates
complying with one national standard as the cost and resources to obtain and maintain
such certificates is significant (Interview 10222011; Kwon, 1985). This impedes the
development of spatially dispersed or global supply chains as, for instance, a French
valve producer with RCC-M accreditation may not be able to sell valves to US-designed
plants that require ASME accreditation. Thus, different national quality standards impede
the emergence of modular and truly global supply chains in the nuclear industry.
(2) High demands for quality and time criticality
Demands on quality are higher in the nuclear power plant industry than in other industries
such as automotive, oil, gas and thermal power plant industries. Modem nuclear power
plants are generally designed for a lifetime of 60 years and the integrity of most
equipment across a plant's lifetime has to be guaranteed (Interview 09182011). Moreover,
the consequences of equipment failure in nuclear power plants are considered to be more
serious than equipment failures in most other industries. Therefore, buyers in the nuclear
power industry pay much attention to the testing and quality assurance of the components
they use (Interview 10282011).
As mentioned above, an important feature of modularity is the independent and reliable
testing and quality assurance by the module supplier. To fully take advantage of modular
production networks, buyers need to have enough faith in their suppliers' ability to
deliver the quality requested. The importance of testing and quality assurance in the
nuclear industry is so high, however, that many buyers do not trust suppliers that they
have not thoroughly screened or worked with over extended periods of time (Interview
10222011). Consequently, relational suppliers are preferred over modular suppliers. In
addition, delays in the delivery of components and the need to rework components
because of insufficient quality have far reaching financial consequences due to the high
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upfront capital costs of nuclear power plant projects (Interview 09142011). As pointed
out in previous chapters, financing costs for the construction of most nuclear power
plants amount to about 25% of the total plant cost which often corresponds to amounts
beyond $1 billion dollars. Delays can increase such amounts significantly through
additional interest, inflation and penalties. Because quality and time criticality play a
crucial role in the nuclear power industry, procurement departments often hesitate to
replace an established and trustworthy supplier in favor of a cheaper but relatively
unknown and potentially riskier alternative.
(3) Lack of experience among suppliers in regard to nuclear industry characteristics
Because of the small number of nuclear construction projects over the last 30 years, the
pool of knowledge in the nuclear power industry has shrunk. In the US alone, the number
of firms with ASME N-stamp accreditation has dropped from about 440 in the 1980s to
255 in 2008 (WNA Heavy, 2012). ASME N-stamps represent firms' abilities to
manufacture safety critical nuclear power plant components at acceptable quality
standards. While today many companies are taking a fresh look at the nuclear power
market, often entering or returning from related sectors, most of these new entrants pose a
potential risk to procurers in that they may not be able to live up to the demands of the
nuclear industry initially, as they lack knowledge and experience regarding characteristic
features of the industry, including the importance of quality, documentation and time
criticality (Aalto University, 2010). This is another reason that makes buyer companies
stick to established, time-proven suppliers.
(4) Proximity as an advantage for future maintenance
Many components of operating nuclear power plants need to be regularly monitored and
maintained. Some components need to be replaced at certain intervals. Physical
proximity between the supplier of such components and the plant they are used in allows
for timely delivery of products and services as well as familiarity of local suppliers with
local plants. For that reason, many component suppliers, particularly for products with
capital requirements lower than those of key components, are chosen from or settle in the
vicinity of plants (Interview 10182011).
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Sometimes this leads to the creation of nuclear power industry parks such as the Haiyan
Nuclear Power Industrial Park or the Rongcheng Nuclear Power Industrial Park. A
nuclear industry expert described nuclear power industry parks the following way:
"Haiyan is a supermarket. It's close to the Qinshan nuclear power plant and all the
companies that come here are like a supermarket for CNNC. You come here, and I buy
from you. They all want to have local manufacturers, so they can get reliable supply"
(Interview 10182011).
This leads to clustering of certain types of suppliers around nuclear power plants rather
than to the kind of dispersion that is typical for modular supply chains. The benefits that
come from the proximity of suppliers to nuclear power plants represent another factor
that hinders the development of modular supply chains in the nuclear industry.
(5) Suppliers as co-developers and co-financiers
Developing new reactor architectures is a lengthy and costly process that even large state-
backed organizations can hardly shoulder on their own. In order to spread the risk and
financial burden of developing new reactors across multiple actors, lead suppliers
sometimes get involved early in the design process. In return for contributing to the new
reactor design in various ways, e.g. financially or by providing human resources, test
facilities, etc., they receive exclusive supply agreements or interfaces that are tailored to
their products (Interview 10142011). At the same time, reactor vendors try to find a
balance between receiving support from lead suppliers and keeping interfaces
standardized in order to avoid being captured by individual suppliers. To the degree that
arm's length relationships occur that involve lead suppliers in the design process in return
for exclusive supply agreements, modularization of that part of the supply chain is
virtually impossible.
We have seen that there are a number of characteristics of the nuclear industry that work against
the formation of modular supply chains. Nevertheless, there are also aspects that are
advantageous. They are as follows:
(1) Change ofproduct architectures is slow and almost always incremental
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From the earliest nuclear reactors in the 1950s onward, the nuclear power industry has
suffered a case of technology lock-in which led to light water reactor designs remaining
the reactors of choice for large scale dissemination (Cowan, 1990). Today, over 95% of
the more than 400 operating reactors globally are water-cooled reactors (IAEA, 2012).
Although this case of technology lock-in has often been criticized for rendering the
nuclear industry inert to new reactor designs, it is in fact beneficial for modularization.
Since the basic product architecture of light water reactors, including the arrangement
and design of steam generators, reactor pressure vessels, reactor coolant pumps, and
turbine-generators, has barely changed over recent decades, this kind of inertia has led to
a certain level of interface standardization among key components. For instance, steam
generators for most nuclear power plants can today be provided by a range of different
suppliers globally as steam generator designs for different plant types are very similar
(Interview 10142011; Interview 09142011). Nuclear reactor vendors who act as product
architects in fact emphasize that their new designs are not radically different from
previous designs and are based on "proven technology" (Westinghouse, 2003; Teller,
2010). Westinghouse advertises its "most advanced, yet proven" nuclear reactor, the
AP1000, in its brochures as being "based on standard Westinghouse Pressurized Water
Reactor (PWR) technology that has achieved more than 3,000 reactor years of highly
successful operation" (Westinghouse, 2009).
The type of mixing and matching, as in the case of steam generators, applies to large key
components whose vendors often operate globally, have established a reputation and have
reference projects to point to which reduces the risk of quality and schedule shortcomings.
Most of such key components sell for $10 million and above, in which case thorough
supplier screening and the acquisition of multiple national accreditations makes more
sense than for suppliers of lower value components. Smaller companies for non-key
components benefit less from the inertia and uniformity among product architectures, as
obstacles to modularity laid out in the previous section still hold, i.e. the burden of
multiple national standards and the importance of being local.
(2) Flexibility in the use of capacity is valued
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Building and maintaining capacity for design, construction and equipment manufacturing
in the nuclear industry is costly and demand has traditionally been unsteady. Once
projects get underway, however, it is critical to be able to ramp up production quickly
and deliver in a timely manner. Companies are more likely to succeed at matching supply
to demand if large orders can be spread across multiple suppliers (Interview 10142011).
If capacity remains within the boundaries of integrated organizations, the risk involved in
maintaining that capacity rests with the organization itself. In the case of modular
supplier relationships, the risk rests with the suppliers.
To maximize utilization of capacity, suppliers often diversify into other markets such as
oil and gas or thermal plant markets. In state-backed nuclear industry environments they
may receive subsidies for maintaining capacity or receive guarantees for continuous long
term demand through planned nuclear power fleet programs.
To summarize, modular production networks provide nuclear power plant vendors with
greater flexibility in utilizing capacity at times of high and low demand and minimize
their risk in maintaining respective capacity by themselves (Interview 10142011).
5.4 The status quo of the global nuclear industry
As we have seen from the previous section, some aspects of today's nuclear industry favor
relational supplier relationships while others favor modular supplier relationships, depending on
the components, organizations and ecosystems concerned. Characteristics that speak against
modularity predominate, however, and the industry status quo favors relational rather than
modular supplier relationships.
Nevertheless, there is a trend towards greater degrees of deverticalization and modularity in
some domains of the global nuclear industry, as I show in the next chapter. This trend is
dependent on geography and is most visible among US nuclear industry firms.
Before the 1990s, all of the large reactor vendors such as Framatome (today's Areva), Siemens,
Rosatom, Westinghouse and GE provided almost all products and services needed to build a
nuclear power plant, ranging from design, to construction oversight, to equipment manufacturing.
Everything was provided in-house, through subsidiaries or through established long term
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partners. They tapped into networks of suppliers that were closely tied to them and mutually
dependent (Interview 01142011).
In the case of Framatome's successor Areva and its long term partner EDF, this structure largely
prevailed until Areva's recent project at Olkiluoto in Finnland and its bids for projects in the
United Arab Emirates where EDF did not join Areva (Berthelemy and Leveque, 2011). The two
Areva projects in Taishan, China, come closer to the original model of close cooperation
between Areva and EDF, however. Here, the two companies brought their established lead
suppliers to China via roadshows and exhibitions in order to fulfill localization requirements by
partnering with Chinese enterprises and at the same time resemble established integrated supplier
structures the companies are used to (Interview 10182011). Today, Areva still claims on its
website "to use its integrated model to consolidate its position as world leader" (Areva, 2012).
Similarly, the Korean nuclear power plant vendor KEPCO divides up most tasks in nuclear
power plant design, equipment manufacturing and construction among its own departments and
subsidiaries such as KEPC E&C, KEPCO Plant Service and established long term partners
Doosan and Hyundai as well as a local production network of smaller Korean enterprises.
Rosatom refers to itself as a "fully integrated technology company" providing fuel fabrication,
equipment manufacturing, design, engineering, construction, operating services, as well as
maintenance and upgrading services (Samoshin, 2012). As a consequence, it offers guaranteed
supply of future products and services.
Compared to integrated firms like Areva, and Rosatom, the US nuclear power reactor vendor
Westinghouse has reached relatively high levels of disintegration and modularization with many
input products and services not only sourced from external suppliers but often sourced from
multiple suppliers (Interview 10142011 and Interview 09142011). The difference becomes most
apparent when comparing staff numbers of the three companies: Rosatom in 2012 had 270,000
employees across more than 250 subsidiaries (Russia Forum, 2012). Areva had 48.000
employees in 2010 (Aubouin, 2010) while Westinghouse had only 15,000 in 2010
(Westinghouse, 2010). The scope of activities of these four companies is very different. KEPCO
and its subsidiaries not only engineer and build nuclear power plants but also operate them. In
addition to nuclear power, Rosatom also has divisions for nuclear weapons, nuclear medicine
and nuclear icebreakers, among others. Such disparate companies may be difficult to be
52
compared but this is part of my argument: Westinghouse, as a lean entity focused on a range of
core activities and managing a broad network of suppliers and partners, competes directly with
nuclear power companies whose character and organization is very different from itself.
In the next section, I elaborate on reasons for such differences and for the deverticalization of
Westinghouse.
5.5 Drivers of modularity in the nuclear industry
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed generic factors that contributed to a trend towards
higher degrees of modularity in many industries. Two major factors were the development and
dissemination of information and communication technology (ICT) and increased specialization
in the manufacturing of components of complex systems.
Apart from these generic factors, different industries and locales experienced particular factors
that accelerated modularization. As Sako (2005) pointed out, in the US computer industry for
instance, "the eventual disintegration of the industry into modular suppliers [...] may be
accounted for by the inter-firm mobility of technical labor and the availability of venture capital
for start-ups." This was complemented by users' demands for better compatibility among
components toward mixing and matching.
In this section, I argue that in the US nuclear industry, disintegration was fueled by the sudden
drop of demand in the 1980s, an qXternal shock, in combination with a general trend towards
modularization particularly in US indusrty, as well as the slow pace of change in product
architecture.
5.5.1 External shock: a sudden drop in demand
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident of 1979 marked a turning point for the US nuclear
industry. Fifty-one orders for US nuclear reactors were canceled in its aftermath. While more
than 100 reactors had been approved prior to 1979 and were subsequently built in the US, no
new reactors were approved until 2012 (WNA USA, 2012). Internationally, only South Korea
continued to steadily build a fleet of nuclear reactors, a development driven by the Korean state.
In France, the state subsidized its nuclear industry and sustained its integral structure to preserve
capacity for building and maintaining nuclear power plants. With more than 75% of French
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electricity produced by nuclear power this was considered a strategic measure (WNA France,
2012).
US nuclear vendors in contrast received hardly any state support and were forced to adapt to the
new market conditions. Leading US nuclear vendors like Westinghouse, GE and CE suddenly
found themselves stranded with large integrated organizations overseeing manufacturing
capacity and workforce for building multiple nuclear power plants per year but without new
orders.
In order to survive and preserve their core competencies, these companies were forced to sell off
large parts of their organizations, including much related equipment manufacturing.
Westinghouse for instance sold its turbine division to Siemens and its Reactor Coolant Pump
(RCP) division to Curtiss Wright. Today, Westinghouse still works closely with Curtiss Wright,
to the degree that the pump manufacturer is involved in the reactor design process. At the same
time, Westinghouse has no obligations towards Curtiss Wright and no responsibility for
maintaining its manufacturing capacity or workforce. Westinghouse is also free to switch to
different RCP suppliers as attractive alternatives emerge.
In regard to heavy forgings, Westinghouse sourced most of its equipment from US Steel and
Bethlehem Steel up to the 1980s (WNA Heavy, 2012). For Generation II reactors the US Steel
and Bethlehem Steel press capacities of 8,000 tons were sufficient. Contemporary Generation III
plants generally require 14-15,000 ton forging presses, however, and since US Steel and
Bethlehem Steel have not upgraded their facilities, companies like Westinghouse were forced to
diversify their supply chains. Today, Westinghouse sources much of its heavy equipment from
ENSA of Spain and Doosan of South Korea (Interview 09142011). It is remarkable that both
ENSA and Doosan were former customers of Westinghouse that had benefited from extensive
technology transfer in the past and developed their expertise partly because of Westinghouse's
earlier support.
The TMI accident and the subsequent drop of new builds coincided with the deverticalization
and modularization of supply chains of organizations like Westinghouse. That move did not take
place to a comparable extent in firms such as in South Korea that did not experience the sudden
drop of demand that US firms experienced. Some industry representatives I interviewed
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suggested that the move towards more modular supply chains of US firms in particular was not
primarily a deliberate strategic decision but rather an inherent necessity for financial survival
(Interview 10142011). An alternative explanation is that deverticalization in the US nuclear
industry was part of a larger general trend among US companies to move toward more modular
supply chains. In any case, managers of major US nuclear vendor companies were able to turn
to and learn from the experience of firms of other industries that underwent deverticalization,
particularly in the automotive, semiconductor and computer industries.
In making the best of their new circumstances, firms like Westinghouse discovered advantages
of the new model and tried to exploit them. This is in line with Sako's observation (2005) that
"benefits of modularity may take some time to emerge when outsourcing runs ahead of
modularization." While US firms had few alternatives and eventually tried to accept their fate
and position their companies newly in global nuclear power markets, deverticalization and
modularity was not a path pursued by companies in other countries that had alternatives, for
instance through government subsidies. These companies largely remained big integrated
organizations.
5.5.2 Modular product architectures
In the previous section, I discussed how factors related to the nuclear industry at large, and even
factors beyond the industry as such, like the TMI accident, affected the structures of
organizations and contributed to higher degrees of modularity. Sako (2005) condensed
differences in the structures of organizations into the concept of "organization architecture." She
then contrasted "organization architecture" with the notion of "product architecture" although the
two are seen as mutually dependent: "product architecture affects organization architecture and
vice versa."
Applying those terms to the nuclear industry, the organization architecture of a company like
Westinghouse turned from very intpgral before the 1980s to more modular after TMI while the
organization architectures of companies like Rosatom, Areva and KEPCO remained relatively
integral. Sako further observed that "non-modular products are best produced in non-modular
organizations. But modular products call for modular organizations." Based on that statement,
one would expect Westinghouse's products to have become more modular over time and more
modular than those of its integrated competitors, or to have been more modular to begin with.
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This is in fact the case: key features of Westinghouse's AP1000, its first major new reactor
design after the disintegration process, are modularity in construction and flexibility in choosing
suppliers. In its advertising materials, Westinghouse emphasizes for instance that "most
equipment and commodities are non-safety class" and that this feature of the design "allows
more procurement of materials from commercial grade suppliers" (Patel, 2008). In contrast to
other nuclear reactors currently deployed, Westinghouse claims that the AP1000 is "modular in
design, promoting ready standardization."
In contrast, Areva's products such as the EPR as well as its organization architecture resemble a
more integrated approach. In its advertising materials, Areva explicitly points to its "in-house
integrated supply chain for key components" (Areva, 2010). This confirms Sako's observation
that "firms with a highly integrated supply chain architecture might be expected to retain a more
integral modular product architecture" and "firms that have made a significant investment in
both deep and diverse technical knowledge are unlikely to promote modular product architecture
that provides competitors with advantages within modules and renders their integrative skills less
valuable." My observations also confirm Gulati and Eppinger (1996) in that "product
architectural choice influences organizational design, but preexisting organization structures and
capabilities also influence product design."
Modular construction techniques and standardization of components have been employed for
decades in other industries such as in ship building, but did not get widely adopted in the nuclear
industry until recently as in the case of the Westinghouse AP 1000 reactor (Interview 09172011).
One can argue that it was not so much the sudden availability of new technology that caused the
recent trend in modularization of nuclear power plant architectures but that the modularization of
the organization architecture facilitated and motivated the modularization of the product
architecture, using technologies that had already been around. Additionally, cost pressures that
played a much larger role in the privately driven nuclear industry in the US than in state driven
nuclear industries in other countries incentivized reactor vendors to innovate in this domain.
Modular construction techniques offered greater cost savings and more reliable construction
schedules. The US nuclear industry had particularly suffered from extensive construction delays
and subsequent cost overruns.
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In reality it was likely a combination of factors that drove modularization: growing pressure to
take advantage of more advanced modular construction techniques observed in other industries,
the expected benefits of modular supply chains, and changing organization architectures that
increasingly called for more modular production architectures.
5.6 Modularity and innovation
The degree of modularity and the nature of organization and product architectures impact firms'
abilities to innovate. Innovation may take place within discrete modules, often within multiple
modules in parallel, and innovation may take place on a systems level, affecting the entire
product. Systems-level innovation may be facilitated by an integrated organization architecture
which allows for better coordination and flexibility in adapting production processes to new
product architectures. This is particularly important for products characterized by
interdependencies and feedback between different product components. In contrast, clear
separation between modules and clear definition of modules promotes greater specialization and
within-module innovation. In summary, different types of product and organization architectures
enable different types of innovation across the spectrum from within-module innovation to
systems-level innovation.
In the following section, I elaborate on differences between within-module innovation and
systems-level innovation. I introduce two cases of within-module innovators, Lightbridge and
KSB, and two cases of systems-level innovators, Siemens/KWU and Rosatom, which I then
evaluate and discuss.
5.6.1 Within-module innovation
Within-module innovation is characterized by "a clear division of labor between the architect
with architectural design knowledge and designers with knowledge of each module." (Sako,
2005) The following two cases illustrate such configurations where designers have developed
specialized knowledge of their module and rely on others for architectural integration.
5.6.1.1 Case 1: New fuel assemblies by Lightbridge
Lightbridge is a US-based company that was formed in 1992 with the explicit goal of developing
new types of nuclear fuel assemblies. Compared to conventional fuel rods, Lightbridge-designed
fuel assemblies use different materials and have different geometries which allow for more
efficient heat transfer from the nuclear fuel to the surrounding cooling water. Lightbridge claims
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to be able to increase electricity production of current light water reactors by 30% , simply by
using different types of fuel assemblies (Lightbridge, 2012). Their product is strictly modular as
no changes on existing reactor are required. A rough analogy for the replacement of conventional
fuel assemblies through advanced Lightbridge fuel assemblies is replacing an inkjet printer
cartridge with a newer cartridge of higher capacity while leaving the printer as such unchanged.
Lightbridge has a small headcount of about 15 fulltime employees (Macroaxis, 2012) but has
extensive partnerships with labs and research centers in the United States and in Russia. Because
of its lean organization architecture the company itself performs the role of a systems integrator
in coordinating among its various partners. However, from the standpoint of a nuclear reactor as
a final product, Lightbridge innovates strictly within a module: "we don't design new reactors,
we design new fuel" and "nuclear fuel is a much simpler project than a whole new reactor"
(Interview 10202011).
Lightbridge has been funded partly through venture capital and partly through offering
consulting services to nuclear power projects around the world. In 2006, the company became
publicly traded on NASDAQ. Lightbridge has not depended on state support and it has not
depended on reactor new builds as its products can be used in existing reactors of which the US
alone still has more than 100 in operation.
In this sense, Lightbridge is a prime example of a company that is developing a highly modular
product. Lightbridge has employed within-module innovation in an environment, the US nuclear
industry, which has moved toward ever greater deverticalization over the past 30 years and it has
found its sweet spot in an increasingly modular network. Nuclear fuel as such used to be highly
monopolized with many reactor vendors contractually requiring their customers to procure
nuclear fuel through them only. In recent years, the industry has moved away from this practice,
giving nuclear operators more choice in procuring their fuel. Lightbridge's activities are further
steps in this direction: beyond choice among alternative fuel suppliers, Lightbridge aims for
providing nuclear operators with the choice of alternative fuel technology. All of these
developments take place within the module of nuclear fuel and hardly affect reactors as a whole.
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5.6.1.2 Case 2: More efficient reactor coolant pumps by KSB
KSB is a German medium sized company that specializes in the production of pumps and has
equipped more than 100 nuclear power plants globally with its products (KSB, 2011). KSB is
developing a new type of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) which reduces maintenance needs and
increases efficiency due to lower power consumption. The basic parameters of RCPs are similar
in most contemporary nuclear power plants and the pumps are generally mounted between steam
generators and primary cycle pipes that come from the reactor pressure vessel. RCPs are
responsible for circulating cooling water in the reactor's primary cycle. KSB's new RCP design
is a wet winding pump where the pump's motor itself is immersed in water which reduces eddy
currents and thereby leads to efficiency gains.
KSB benefits from the well-established and fairly standardized designs of light water reactors.
Because of the technology lock-in in regard to light water reactors, similar RCPs can be used by
different reactor vendors, e.g. Areva or Westinghouse. RCPs are sufficiently standardized to
allow for some degree of mixing and matching across different reactor types. KSB has
positioned itself in a discretely defined module within which it has specialized and innovated.
As a Germany company, it did so in an environment where it has lost its strategic long term
partner Siemens due to the deverticalization of Siemens' nuclear power department in the 1990s
and Siemens' exit from the nuclear power business in the 2000s. Today, KSB is largely
autonomous and not bound to any individual partner.
5.6.2 Systems-level innovation
Systems-level innovation is characterized by changes that impact multiple aspects of a given
product, sometimes changing the nature of the product itself. The following two cases illustrate
such configurations.
5.6.2.1 Case 3: Gas cooled high temperature reactor HTR-Modul by Siemens/KWU
The HTR-Modul, a gas cooled high temperature reactor, was a next generation nuclear reactor
architecture that was designed to be inherently safe. The HTR-Modul differed substantially from
light water reactors: it used gas and graphite for cooling and moderation instead of water and
consequently required very different equipment; it was different in size and capacity and used
spherical fuel elements as opposed to fuel rod assemblies. Virtually all key components of the
HTR-Modul differed substantially from key components in light water reactors.
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The HTR-Modul was developed jointly by Siemens/KWU, the Juelich Nuclear Research Center
and Aachen University in the 1980s. At the time, Siemens' nuclear power subsidiary KWU was
itself a highly integrated organization and embedded in the larger Siemens conglomerate.
Relations between Siemens/KWU, Juelich and Aachen University had developed over decades
and were extremely close with many key developers having worked or been educated in all three
organizations in the course of their careers. Moreover, an engineer involved in the HTR-Modul
design described the proximity to the larger Siemens group as invaluable, given that thousands of
experts in all related fields were within arm's length and could be drawn upon if additional
expertise was required (Interview 01142011).
The HTR-Modul project was discontinued by Siemens/KWU after public opinion moved against
nuclear power in Germany in the late 1980s. However, the design is implemented in large part in
the Chinese HTR-PM reactor which is currently under construction in China's Shandong
province. It is one of the few reactors under construction globally that are classified as
Generation IV reactor designs.
5.6.2.2 Case 4: Sodium-cooled fast reactor BN-1200 by Rosatom
The BN-1200 reactor is another one of the few Generation IV reactor designs whose construction
has been approved with expected commissioning by the end of the 2010s. The BNP-1200 is a
fast neutron reactor which uses liquid sodium as a coolant. Liquid sodium has very different
chemical and radiological properties compared to the water used in light water reactors and,
therefore, large parts of sodium cooled reactors require the use of different materials. The reactor
design itself is substantially different from light water reactors with different demands on fuel,
vessels, pumps, steam generators, etc. The new design creates inter-module dependencies and the
need for evaluating large amounts of feedback between what would be considered separate
modules in established reactor architectures.
The BNP-1200 is developed by Rosatom, Russia's state-owned nuclear reactor vendor which is a
highly integrated corporation that controls more than 150 manufacturing and research
organizations in the Russian nuclear industry (Rosatom, 2010). Major stakeholders are
subsidiaries of Rosatom, the engineering firm OKBM Afrikantov, the design institute
Atomenergoproekt and the research center SSC RF - IPPE.
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This new sodium-cooled fast reactor was developed in a large state-owned organization that has
been tightly integrated over decades.
5.6.3 Moving across product generations
In the previous section, I laid out cases of within-module innovation and systems-level
innovation which corresponded to different organization architectures and led to very different
types of products. We have seen cases of within-module innovation corresponding with modular
organization architectures and cases of systems-level innovation corresponding to integral
organization architectures.
It is difficult to assess which type of innovation leads to more value creation over time. Frankly,
we do not have much experience with the introduction of new reactor architectures in the nuclear
industry because of the almost exclusive focus on large light water reactors in the commercial
energy space. In the past 60 years, most proposed new reactor architectures failed. The
experience of other industry sectors suggests, however, that at some point the nuclear industry
too may experience disruptive changes toward a new product generations. Hobday et al. (2005)
expressed this expectation the following way: "At regular, recurring points existing product
architectures must be transcended if performance limits are to be overcome and technological
progress is to continue." They add with respect to systems integration: "Systems integration is
not simply a static capability concerned with current product generations. It is also a dynamic
capability essential for moving successfully from one product generation to another."
Russia and China in particular declared as their explicit goals the introduction of Generation IV
reactors and their deployment on a wide scale by 2030 (WNA Russia, 2012; WNA China, 2012).
Given their nuclear industries' massive state support and successful track record of recent years,
one may argue that next generation reactor architectures are likely to be introduced to the global
nuclear market within the coming two decades. Given the systems-level nature of new reactor
designs, and the insight that systems-level innovation is associated with integrated as opposed to
modular organization architectures, it is not surprising to see Russia and China lead efforts
towards the deployment of next generation nuclear reactors. Rosatom emphasizes its ability to
innovate is reflected in its "broad development programme" for generation IV fast reactors and
its efforts in the domain of small and medium size reactors including floating nuclear power
plants (Samoshin, 2012). Chinese nuclear power organizations focus on generation IV fast and
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gas-cooled reactors as well as small modular light water reactors, and have recently allocated
additional resources for a molten-salt reactor program (WNA China, 2012).
There are proposals for new reactor architectures in the US too, but many of them are either
evolutionary in nature and based on existing light water reactor technology or they are still in
conceptual stages, far from being licensed, let alone deployed. It is doubtful whether firms that
move toward higher degrees of modularity such as Westinghouse or even smaller firms that start
out focusing purely on design and project management such as Terrapower or Flibe could cope
with the demands of detailed plant designs, equipment design, manufacturing and construction
oversight without the support of large integrated organizations or tight relational supplier
networks.
5.6.4 Modularity trap
A potential future shift toward next generation reactor technologies involving new product
architectures with different materials and designs, could pose a threat to established modular
production networks. A new product architecture would likely disrupt the decomposition of
designs and rearrange modules in the supply chain. For instance, if helium gas cooled reactors
became more common, KSB's water pumps could get displaced by helium blowers. Many
modular suppliers could find themselves in a so called "modularity trap." According to Sako
(2005), "in such a trap, benefits from a shift in an industry from a modular to a more integral
phase of technological development cannot be exploited fully by firms due to inertia in
organization structure more suited to serving modular product architecture." Companies like
Westinghouse and KSB might have difficulties to adapt to such a new situation with their supply
chains being well adapted to the established technology's product architecture, i.e. light water
reactors. Over time, and with large scale deployment, one would expect new reactor architectures
that will likely start out as integrated designs to become increasingly modularized too. Some
companies may make the successful transition from a module of the old product architecture to a
module of the new product architecture, although the latter may be a different one than the
former. Other companies may be displaced by competitors that are better positioned within the
new supply chains.
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5.6.5 Capturing value from innovation across product cycles
Across product cycles, both within-module and systems-level innovation contribute to the
advancement of products. Historically, firms have created and captured value through both types
of innovation. But how can firms maximize their participation in the different types of
innovation processes?
Using an example from the computer component industry, Hobday et al. (2005) suggest that
"product designs can oscillate between modular and 'integrative' states as progress from one
design to another occurs." Despite the many differences between the computer components
industry and the nuclear industry, we can also differentiate between more modular and more
integrative states of nuclear reactor designs over the course of a product cycle. During the
development of new nuclear reactor designs, when designs are necessarily in a more integrative
state, integrated organizations benefit from their organization architecture (Interview 01142011).
It is often those integrated organizations that develop new reactor designs and build so called
First-Of-A-Kind (FOAK) reactors for a new product generation. As a next step in the product
cycle, standardization may take place and the decomposition of the integrated product into
modules. The Nth-Of-A-Kind (NOAK) reactor may then be produced in a more modular way in
order to lower cost, optimize the use of capacities and take advantage of within-module
innovation. At this stage, organizations with modular organization architectures may be at an
advantage.
Charles Fine (1999) introduced the concept of clock speed as a measure of pace at which
changes take place in a particular industry. Of course, the difference in clock speed between the
nuclear industry and the computer component industry is vast. What may take months in the
computer component industry, may take decades in the nuclear industry. Nevertheless, I expect
nuclear reactor product designs too to oscillate between integrated and modular states, although
this may only take place over relatively long periods of time. At the same time, I do not expect
organization architectures to follow such oscillations. Sako (2005) suggests that "assemblers will
vertically integrate when the production process, broadly defined, produces specialized,
nonpatentable know-how." This suggests that modular organizations tend to integrate as they
anticipate opportunities through knowhow in production processes and product designs.
However, alternatives to vertical integration for modular firms, while still benefiting from
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advantages of vertical integration, are to find vertically integrated partners. With close
partnerships to vertically integrated partners, modular firms can ensure their ability to carve out
new roles in future modular supply chains as transitions to new product generations take place.
Instead of oscillation of organization architectures from integral to modular and back, I present
an alternative model of coexistence of modular and integral companies. In this model, integrated
and modular companies benefit from each other's advantages through partnerships: modular
companies bring within-modules knowhow to integrated partners; integrated partners develop
new production generations and carve out future roles for their modular partners as initially
integrated product architectures get increasingly modular over time.
I believe the coexistence of modular and integral companies in partnerships to be a more likely
model vis-d-vis a model of oscillating reintegration of disintegration due to the high capital
investments involved in transitioning between states and the large differences among companies
around the world with respect to government support and their local ecosystems.
This view would imply that the types of partnerships that firms engage in and the characteristics
of the different partners available become even more important.
5.7 The future of modularity in the nuclear industry
5.7.1 Trends toward mass production
Hobday et al. (2005) emphasized that so called Complex Product Systems (CoPS) such as
project-based power plant projects are very different from high-volume products. Specifically,
these projects involve less standardization and modularization and more custom and dynamically
changing components. This statement applies to the nuclear industry.
There are, however, several trends toward greater levels of standardization. The benefits of
standardization of reactor designs and components for national nuclear fleet programs became
obvious with the experience of the French fleet build up (David and Rothwell, 1996). In France,
a particular nuclear reactor design was chosen and a whole batch of nearly identical reactors built
based on the design of the original. After localization of major technologies, South Korea
pursued a similar approach and from the 1990s onward deployed OPR-1000 reactors modeled on
the CE "System 80" design. This type of standardization guaranteed that within each batch of
nuclear reactors the same components and production processes could be employed.
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Consequently, this opened up opportunities for certain degrees of modularity among suppliers as
the expectation of larger batches of orders increases the incentives for suppliers outside of the
relational network to adapt to respective specifications and for procurers to invest in screening
new suppliers. This then leads to a greater pool of potential suppliers.
A different trend toward greater levels of modularization comes from so called Small and
Medium Reactors (SMRs). These are new reactor architectures that are defined by the IAEA to
be of less than 300 MWe capacity (Subki, 2012). More than a dozen different designs are
currently being explored, mainly in the US, Russia, Japan, Europe, China and South Korea
(WNA SMR, 2012). Most of these reactors consist of very compact and simplified designs with
little on-site construction work required and major components manufactured as discrete
modules in factories. SMRs are deliberately advertised for their "economies of mass production"
versus "economies of scale" characteristics which include more efficient use of labor, the
application of industrial learning processes, more efficient procurement, the reuse of
specifications, drawings and procedures, and mechanization optimization opportunities. The
trend is exemplified by Wallace et al. (2005): "Although building a nuclear power plant is not a
typical high-volume manufacturing process, for the PBMR-type of plant [a type of SMR], with
its high degree of standardization and relatively small, simplified design, the shift to factory
work has a significant impact on overall project cost due to earlier identification and better
coordination of parallel construction paths."
Toshiba's 4S reactor, nicknamed a "nuclear battery," and completely mass produced in a factory,
pushes the frontier of potential mass production of nuclear reactors. The entire reactor would be
contained in a single vessel of size 2 meter height and 0.68 meter diameter (WNA SMR, 2012).
A small steam turbine and generator above ground would then produce 10 MWe of electricity. In
order to reach higher capacity levels, multiple small reactors would be coupled and operated in
parallel. A pre-application for the Toshiba 4S is currently under review by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and submission of the full license application is expected in the
third quarter of 2012.
Small factory-produced reactors like the Toshiba 4S would have very little in common with the
characteristic challenges of large nuclear reactor building site projects of 1000 MWe and beyond
light water reactors such as the Olkiluoto project. If small reactors do reach the scale of diffusion
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that some industry observers predict, they could impact the nuclear industry as a whole.
Employing the techniques involved in nuclear equipment manufacturing on a mass scale would
almost certainly also influence equipment manufacturing for large reactors by making it more
standardized and modular.
5.7.2 Value stream positioning
In more modular supply chains, firms have to constantly reevaluate and readjust their position in
the value stream. In the words of Hobday et al. (2005): "At the level of industry value stream,
systems integration is the capability by which a firm decides where and how to situate itself,
influencing how a firm competes, who it collaborates with, and who it competes with." Hobday
et al. showed that companies in modular supply chains "are moving from both down- and
upstream positions to try and capture the higher value territory situated between manufacturing
and services."
We observe this process taking place in a wide range of industries. Firms such as Alstom, GE
and Ericsson have increasingly tied services to their hardware products. For instance, Alstom
developed a train management system which it marketed along with its trains. Similarly, the
servicing of train fleets has become a major business opportunity for Alstom, as it often provides
more revenue over the lifetime of a train than the train purchase itself (Hoday et al., 2005).
Companies in the nuclear industry face similar challenges. The more modular a company the
more important is the question of where in the value stream it is situated. A company like
Westinghouse that has moved from being an integrated provider of most parts of the nuclear
value chain to becoming an engineering company focusing on design, maintenance and fuel
services has to choose carefully which activities to focus on. Margins in the manufacturing of
heavy key components tend to be low and require high initial investments and associated risk
(Tong, 2010), so it is no surprise that Westinghouse is hardly involved in this area any more. One
possibility for Westinghouse in the future is to move further downstream. While outsourcing
larger portions of design and project management, it could focus on activities with even higher
margins such as branding, financing and consulting.
Sako (2005) describes a possible scenario in the automotive industry "in which OEMs will focus
purely on styling and marketing, withdrawing from manufacturing and assembly altogether. In
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this scenario, some OEMs would wish to delegate systems integration tasks to powerful suppliers
that can design a whole car." Hobday et al. (2005) introduces a similar case from project based
industries: "The prime contractor can be separated from the systems integrator which means that,
in some cases, the systems integration task itself is outsourced to a supplier firm." Could such
scenarios be possible in the nuclear industry? How far away from the production process can a
company move and interpret systems integration as coordination of other systems integrators?
For its AP1000 projects in China, Westinghouse has already outsourced detailed design tasks to
SNERDI in Shanghai (Interview 09072011). If engineers in Shanghai turn out to be more
competitive than engineers in Pittsburgh, Westinghouse may stick to this approach and expand
its collaboration with SNERDI to other projects. However, Sako warns that "product system
makers which outsource design often have to retain substantial knowledge about production
process and product design in-house." This poses the question of the extent to which systems
integrators like Westinghouse can retain systems integration capabilities without direct
involvement in production and construction activities. This is an important question - though
outside the scope of this thesis - that deserves attention in the future. In this section, I showed
that deverticalization and modularity pose new challenges to companies in the global nuclear
industry. With the industry becoming more dynamic due to leaner and more modular players, all
industry actors, deverticalized or not, are forced to stay on top of global and regional industry
trends. They need to know their potential partners and competitors and constantly identify new
opportunities to reposition themselves across the nuclear value stream and in relation to other
organizations.
5.8 Summary
The global nuclear industry today is characterized by a polarity. In contrast to other industries
that exhibit general trends towards higher degrees of modularity or higher degrees of integration,
companies in the global nuclear industry have pursued both paths. Different environments led to
different organization architectures, some more modular and some more integral.
For a number of reasons, companies like Westinghouse increasingly deverticalized and came to
embrace skills and strategies similar to firms of other sectors that are characterized by modular
production networks. Modular organization architectures impact an organization's ability to
source globally and to involve new suppliers in their supply networks. From that perspective,
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technology transfer and localization shine yet another light: they contribute to expanding and
diversifying global supplier networks and to making them more modular in nature. The ability to
develop and manage such supplier networks in and of itself becomes an important capability in
the toolset of systems integrator firms such as Westinghouse.
Companies like South Korea's KEPCO and China's CGN pursued a different strategy; they grew
into large integrated organizations. For them, much systems integration takes place within their
own organizations. These organizations can deal with interdependencies and feedback across
product systems effectively and are well positioned to develop and deploy new generations of
products.
Instead of observing a single trend from integration to disintegration, as in many other industries,
I observe two trends that take place at the same time: one toward greater disintegration and one
toward greater integration. This is exemplified by companies like Westinghouse on one side of
the spectrum and companies like KEPCO on the other.
Modular and integrated organization architectures coexist and each organization architecture has
unique advantages. Modular architectures promote within-module innovation, allow for more
flexibility, lower costs and deeper localization. Integral architectures allow for systems-level
innovation, better communication and greater reliability. Additionally, integral architectures are
often supported by national governments and can draw on various types of benefits this entails.
One way for both modular and integrated organizations to compensate for their weaknesses and
take advantage of their counterparts' strengths is to form partnerships to take advantage of the
best of both worlds.
The partnerships between Westinghouse and KEPC and between Westinghouse and SNTPC
illustrate such partnerships.
Westinghouse does not have the advantages a state-backed integrated organization has, such as
the ability to build and maintain large production capacity and relational supplier networks.
Working closely with partners like the Chinese nuclear industry helps Westinghouse compensate
for these shortcomings. Westinghouse can also benefit from SNPTC's strong financial
background from the Chinese state, even for projects overseas as in the UK where the two
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companies are preparing a joint bid. Westinghouse can draw from a pool of new suppliers and
subcontractors that are emerging in China for its global projects. It is sourcing more and more of
the components for its nuclear reactors globally, at low margins, and has an interest in
broadening its production network. This increases competition and pressures margins even more.
At the same time, Westinghouse needs to position itself carefully, so as to not lose control over
its supply chains and to remain on top of global developments in the industry.
For its part, the Chinese nuclear industry with its highly integrated organizations invited
Westinghouse on board and has since been developing a new standalone nuclear organization,
SNPTC, which is meant to learn from Westinghouse. SNPTC is set to become leaner and more
modular than its competitors and partners, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and
CGN. SNTPC can use Westinghouse's brand name to get a foot in the door internationally, again,
as seen in the UK.
The extent to which such new configurations are stable or transient remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, the spectrum from modular nuclear organizations on the one side to integrated
nuclear organizations on the other side is real and represents the global environment into which
the Chinese nuclear industry is growing. Chinese companies are chosen as partners, and are
choosing partners, in order to position themselves in the nuclear value chain domestically and
globally. To understand the development of the Chinese nuclear industry, we cannot look at it in
isolation but rather view it as an actor in a global dynamic process of nuclear industry
development and consolidation.
PART III - CHINESE IDIOSYNCRASIES
After discussing trends in the global nuclear industry and how they relate to the Chinese nuclear
industry, I now turn to characteristics of the Chinese nuclear industry itself. I find idiosyncrasies
that stem from China's peculiar path of economic development and manifest themselves in the
nuclear industry as well as in other industries. In the following paragraphs I discuss four central
ones in some detail. I argue that the Chinese nuclear industry exhibits unique features that need
to be understood both by Chinese and foreign actors involved.
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6 Idiosyncrasies of Chinese economic development and their impact on the Chinese nuclear
industry
6.1 Government support and industrial policy
China's efforts in the field of nuclear fission can be traced back to the 1950s. At the time, the
Chinese government pursued the development of nuclear weapons, resulting in the testing of its
first nuclear bomb in 1964. In the 1970s and 1980s much of the capacity in the nuclear weapons
industry was transformed into a civilian nuclear power program. The Second Ministry of
Machine Building turned into the Ministry of Nuclear Industry, which eventually became CNNC,
China's largest nuclear power company today (NTI, 2012).
However, as Xu (2010) demonstrated, the Chinese civilian nuclear power program was
fragmented and lacked coherent leadership and political support until the 2000s. It was only in
2002, when two-thirds of China's provinces faced power shortages, pollution was severe
nationwide, and the transportation network suffered bottlenecks from coal transport that China
developed a coherent long-term energy policy with nuclear power playing a significant role.
In 2008, the National Energy Administration was founded to guide nuclear power development
under a comprehensive energy policy. Earlier, nuclear power had not been able to compete with
expanding coal capacity both for cost reasons and for lack of a credible long term policy that
would have created a reliable investment climate. Nuclear power was now recognized by the
Chinese government as a proven "new energy" technology that was readily available and could
help the country achieve energy security and pollution mitigation (Xu, 2010).
China's economy has been growing at double-digit and high single-digit rates since the opening
and reform policies of the late 1970s. Energy demand naturally grew to fuel the booming
economy. In 2010 and 2011, electricity consumption grew by 14.56% and 11.7% respectively,
with total consumption reaching 4693 billion kWh by the end of 2011 (WNA China, 2012).
Installed capacity in 2011 was 1052 GWe and is expected to reach about 1600 GWe in 2020 and
2000 GWe in 2025. In 2011, investments into electricity infrastructure amounted to CNY 705
billion (~$107 billion).
In 2002, the State Planning Commission - predecessor to the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) and China's central planning body at the time - began to set targets for
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nuclear power development as part of overall energy infrastructure development. China plans to
create 800 GW of new electricity generation capacity by 2020, 32 GW of which is to come from
nuclear power (Xu, 2010). In subsequent years, the nuclear target was revised to 36 GW, 40 GW,
and 70 GW. By 2011, the target had been lifted to 80 GW. As a consequence of delays in nuclear
power expansion caused by safety investigations following Fukushima, the target was lowered
again to 70 GW in 2011 (Hua and Stanway, 2012). In 2006, the NDRC presented a Medium- to
Long Term Nuclear Energy Development Plan specifying details of the planned nuclear
expansion. The "active development" of nuclear power was also highlighted in the 1 1 th Five-
Year-Plan (2006-2010) and in the 12th Five-Year-Plan 2011-2015. Since 2008, additional funds
have been made available to companies in the nuclear industry through the Chinese economic
stimulus plan (Interview 09202011). The State Council Research Office determined that by 2020,
an additional CNY 1 trillion (-$151 billion) will be spent on nuclear power development, in
addition to units already under construction (WNA China, 2012).
Today, three companies are allowed to hold majority ownership in nuclear reactors in China:
CNNC, CGN and SNPTC. All three are SOEs and subordinate to the State-owned Assets
Supervision & Administration Commission (SASAC). CGN is 45% owned by the Guangdong
provincial government, 45% by CNNC and 10% by CPI. SNPTC is 60% owned by the State
Council and 10% by each of the following entities: CNNC, CPI, CGN, and the China National
Technical Import & Export Corporation (WNA China, 2012b).
CNNC has more than 100 subsidiaries and 100,000 staff members (NTI, 2012). According to
the WNA, CNNC planned to "invest CNY 800 billion (-$120 billion) into nuclear energy
projects by 2020," part of which may be financed through public offerings. An IPO is expected
to raise funds for five nuclear power plants, amounting to CNY 173.5 billion, or roughly $27
billion (Shen and Takada, 2012).
CNNC is not the only state-owned nuclear company raising funds. According to press reports, in
2009, CGN set up a "fund-raising agreement with Bank of China, China Development and other
institutions [...] to raise a total of 10 billion yuan" (Klamann, 2009). CGN has more than 30
subsidiaries and more than 20,000 staff members (Interview 09032011).
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6.1.1 Summary
We have seen that there are a number of programs and policies in place indicating China's long-
term commitment to nuclear power development and the state's willingness to provide large
funds to fuel that development. Apart from the government-backed SOEs, private firms --
equipment suppliers for instance -- can apply for subsidies from national or local governments.
The scale of available funds and the political determination behind China's nuclear power
program as a national key project, distinguishes this from other nuclear industries.
6.2 Synergies across industries in the context of economic development
With its wide range of required components and skills, the nuclear industry overlaps with other
industries in many areas. Many products and services used in the building of nuclear power
plants are similar or virtually the same as those involved in projects in other industries. Thus, we
can draw two linkages: the nuclear power industry can benefit from developments in related
industries; and related industries can benefit from developments in the nuclear power industry. I
provide examples for each in the following paragraphs.
In the domain of steel, for instance, only a small portion of the total amount of steel used in
building a nuclear power plant needs to be certified as "nuclear-grade" steel (which requires
extensive and expensive testing). The bulk of steel employed is common carbon steel, mostly
used as rebar (Interview 09172011). Consequently, the nuclear industry can benefit directly from
the development of even conventional local steel industries.
With regard to skills, the degree of overlap with other industries is reflected in a statement by
Lewe and Couchman (1977) of NUS Corporation: "Besides key lead engineers, only a small
fraction of the project team needs to have previous nuclear experience." The majority of the
3000+ workers that are usually deployed at the peak of a nuclear building project do not have
nuclear-specific educational backgrounds and have often been recruited from related industries
(Interviews 09182011). These include electricians, builders and welders, or university graduates
majoring in mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering.
Etel Solingen (1996) investigated the effects of spin-offs and linkages to and from the nuclear
industry in Brazil and Argentina. She observed: "On the one hand, metallurgical skills have been
critical to the establishment of a nuclear industry. On the other hand, development of new and
superior metals can improve the performance of other important industrial sectors, including
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machine tools, electric power generation, jet engines, and railroads. Even critics of the nuclear
program in Brazil acknowledged a few gains in this area, specifically in the production of high
quality steel components."
Similarly, Clyde B. Tatum, a practitioner in the nuclear construction industry, has noted how
"innovative approaches" in the nuclear construction industry can be transferred "to other
segments of the construction industry [and] will improve overall performance [...]" (Tatum,
1983).
The benefits run both ways: conventional construction industries can also benefit the nuclear
construction industry. In a report on "Advanced Construction Methods for New Nuclear Power
Plants" by the IAEA (2009), the author states: "The construction methods available for new
nuclear power plants are generally the same as those used for other large construction projects.
There have been numerous improvements in construction methods in the past few years, and
recent experience in nuclear power plant construction has shown that those advanced methods
are fully applicable and can help shorten construction schedules."
In his book "Concrete Technology - Theory and Practice," M. L. Gambhir (2009) points out that
"for nuclear concrete it's not so much the materials that are special or difficult but rather the way
they are processed, mixed, dried, etc." Consequently, much of the materials for nuclear concrete
can be sourced from the same pool that conventional construction industries source from.
These were examples from the literature that illustrate a potential for cross-fertilization between
nuclear and related industries. The nuclear industry benefits from advances in the local
production of raw materials such as steel and concrete, more advanced construction and project
management techniques, improvements in metal work, as well as more and better human
resources on the labor market and in other domains.
In summary, the Chinese nuclear industry can benefit from the technological progress in many
other sectors of the economy due to cross-fertilization. In the course of its development since the
1970s, the Chinese economy has made progress in many related industries that the nuclear
industry could benefit from. I develop this argument by presenting the case of the Chinese
construction industry in more detail in the following section. Similar cases of cross-fertilization
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can be found in other domains, such as project management, procurement, quality assurance,
metal handling, welding, instrumentation and control, etc.
6.2.1 Case study: the Chinese construction industry
The Chinese nuclear construction industry is dominated by the China Nuclear Engineering
Construction Corporation (CNEC) who played a central role in constructing each of the 14
nuclear power plant projects in China, as well as in the units currently under construction. In
addition to CNEC, other large Chinese construction companies have moved into the nuclear
sector as contractors (Dynabond, 2010). Contractors in turn hire subcontractors out of an even
larger pool of Chinese construction companies.
CNEC has five subsidiaries: CN123, CNF, Huaxing, CN122, and CN124. Among them, CN123 is
most active, shouldering almost 80% of the contracts (Dynabond, 2010). In the past, different
subsidiaries worked in relative isolation from each other, signing separate contracts with the
general contractor. Recently, there has been a push towards more integration to improve
cooperation and communication among the subsidiaries.
Before 1999, CNEC was a part of CNNC. After CNEC split off from CNNC, funding became a
persistent problem. Despite revenue generated from CNEC's involvement in all Chinese nuclear
power plant projects, it lacked a steady income stream. (Nuclear power plant orders are placed at
intervals and payments are dispersed). By contrast, CNNC and CGN had constant revenue
streams from operating existing plants. CNEC employs more than 20,000 people and has
substantial machinery assets. In order to sustain its capacity, the company was forced to diversify
into other industries, such as petrochemicals. Because of that, around 70% of CNEC's activity
still lies in the non-nuclear domain (Dynabond, 2010). Thus, CNEC has had much exposure to
other construction fields, their practices and actors.
CNEC and the Chinese nuclear construction industry at large have over time increased their
competitiveness. This took place through (1) ongoing involvement in projects and learning-by-
doing and (2) as part of an ongoing process of modernization and learning in the Chinese
construction industry as a whole. I elaborate on both points as follows.
(1) CNEC describes itself as "the world's leading nuclear construction enterprise" (CNEC, 2012).
Whether that is accurate may be open to debate, but CNEC is certainly the only construction
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company globally that is simultaneously involved in more than two dozen nuclear power plant
projects. There is little doubt that some forms of learning will take place as a result (Interview
10282011). In fact, CNEC's own slogan is "practice makes perfect."
The company has collected data from each project it was involved in, which it utilizes for future
projects. CNEC's experience has cemented its position as a construction company of choice for
nuclear power plant projects. CNEC has taken further steps towards modernization. It has
founded a subsidiary called Huahui whose goal is the development of a computer-based nuclear
construction management system for experience management. The system is currently used at
construction sites for the new AP1000 reactors in Sanmen and Haiyang. CNEC has also
mastered advanced construction technologies in the domains of lifting and erection, modular
construction, advanced concrete pouring techniques, and automated welding techniques (CNEC,
2012).
This has gone hand in hand with an effort to standardize and optimize construction procedures.
CNEC encountered foreign management philosophies and management systems through its
involvement with American, French, Canadian and Russian companies. Nevertheless, as a state-
owned company, CNEC is still known to be slow to adapt to new concepts and has been
described as still culturally and structurally quite different from its foreign counterparts
(Dynabond, 2010).
(2) Other construction companies such as thermal power plant construction companies and
railway construction companies have been moving into the field of nuclear construction in recent
years. For civil construction at the Taishan nuclear power plant for instance, the project owner
CGN has signed a contract with China Railway No. 2 Engineering Group. The Chinese nuclear
regulator NNSA has to date granted certifications for nuclear construction to 14 companies.
Some of the most prominent cases involve the Shandong Electric Power Construction Company
which built the conventional island of the Haiyang nuclear power plant and the Guangdong
Thermal Power Construction Company (Dynabond, 2010).
With tenfold growth from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. the construction industry was one of
the first in China to take off (Vickridge and Lu, 1999). In fact, one could even say that the
construction industry was the very backbone of China's rapid economic development, which was
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heavily driven by infrastructure spending. In the late 1980s, a dedicated ministry, the Ministry of
Construction, was established to boost the industry's development. Already in 1994, China had
460 international contracting companies and 50 Chinese-foreign JVs in the construction sector
(Ahmad and Yan, 1996). There was a strong base to begin with: 10,250 design institutes, with
752,000 employees in 1994.
Since then, the Chinese construction sector matured through domestic projects and partnerships
as well as overseas contracts. Chinese companies have built tens of thousands of kilometers of
railway and highway and hundreds of power plants, dams, airports and bridges. (Vickridge and
Lu, 1999) Over time, companies introduced competitive bidding, advanced technology, efficient
management and quality control. Inspection companies also emerged. In 1996, there were
already 1,383 supervision agencies employing more than 70,000 staff (Ahmad and Yan, 1996).
Capacity expansion and productivity growth continued into the 2000s (Xue et al. 2008). In 2011,
22 Chinese companies featured in the top 100 list of global construction contractors assembled
by Engineering News-Record (ENR, 2011), more than any other country. According to this
ranking, four of the five top global construction companies are Chinese.
Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese construction industry, several studies
concluded that abundant manpower, low cost construction materials, close government relations
and experience on large scale projects are key strengths. Weaknesses include a high level of
separation between design and construction activities, weak financial capabilities of construction
firms themselves, low levels of innovation and relatively slow adoption of state-of-the-art
technologies (Lu et al., 2009; Zhao et al., 2009). Chinese construction companies continue to
modernize and to learn from their foreign competitors. There has been increasing foreign
investment in Chinese construction companies and reforms towards international practices. This
cross-border cooperation may help advance the Chinese construction industry beyond its present
weaknesses.
Given the experience and evolution of the Chinese construction industry, as well as the synergy
between the construction sector at large and the nuclear construction industry, it is not surprising
to hear from a French nuclear industry expert in China that Western construction companies
''cannot live up to the level of construction companies in China." The industry expert praised
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their expertise in civil engineering and stated: "their processes are very good." As a consequence,
"because of their efficiency," he predicted that Western nuclear reactor vendors will work with
Chinese nuclear construction companies overseas (Interview 10182011).
6.2.2 Summary
The case of the nuclear construction industry illustrates how Chinese economic development and
its manifestation in various sectors impact the nuclear power industry. In regard to construction,
this process is driven by nuclear construction companies being widely involved in non-nuclear
projects and by construction companies in other sectors being increasingly involved in nuclear
construction projects. Skills, materials and processes in nuclear and non-nuclear construction
sectors are similar, and to a large extent nuclear and non-nuclear construction firms can draw on
the same pool of human resources.
I argue that similar cases can be made for other industries and that the Chinese nuclear industry
as a whole benefits from such synergies between the developing nuclear industry and the
developing economy as a whole.
6.3 Labor in all variations: vast and diverse labor market
Synergies between different manufacturing sectors described above create a large mobile pool of
human resources. This has already been discussed in the previous section but deserves more
elaboration due to its importance for the competitiveness of many Chinese firms.
In my interviews, interviewees repeatedly praised Chinese labor for its distinct qualities
(Interview 09072011; Interview 0905201,1; Interview 10282011). Chinese employees are
generally described as "hard-working" and "eager to learn" (Interview 09052011). Both workers
and engineers are described as having "a different type of drive" compared to other parts of the
world. Another important factor is the fact that the Chinese ecosystem provides a wide spectrum
of skills and labor costs. The president of a European equipment manufacturer said, "There is
every level from very good to very bad" in China (Interview 09052011). The levels of
qualification tend to correlate to the cost of labor, with graduates from Chinese top universities
demanding salaries as high as in many Western countries and graduates from other universities
and common workers demanding less.
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For an American supplier of power plant equipment and EPC services this was a decisive factor
in choosing China as a location for detailed engineering. Although headquartered in the US, the
China president of the enterprise described his enterprise as a "truly global company" with "a
global division of labor" (Interview 09072011). The company has an "innovation center" in
Europe staffed with the "lead technical guys, the grey-haired staff," detailed engineering and
design teams in Shanghai and manufacturing in Guangdong. The detailed engineering and design
facility in Shanghai employs 200 Chinese staff, of whom 100 are engineers. Today, even for
projects in the US, conceptual engineering takes place in Europe, detailed engineering in
Shanghai and equipment manufacturing in Guangdong. The former US location for detailed
engineering and design is "no longer needed."
The company's location decisions were not informed merely by low-cost labor available in
China; rather, by the fact that they could find low-cost low-skill labor as well as high-cost high-
skill labor in the same region. While there are big differences in labor skills and costs across
different universities, everyone in the company's Shanghai office has a university degree and
most have Master's degrees. The interviewee praised Chinese engineers for their high efficiency
and young age. In addition, Chinese engineers "have a very strong technology background, great
design abilities." The interviewee considered graduates from good Chinese universities such as
Fudan and Tsinghua better trained than many graduates from Western universities.
A foreign nuclear reactor vendor presented a similar example. This company had outsourced
some of its detailed design operations to a partner in China. In addition to their strong motivation,
representatives of this company also praised Chinese engineers for their knowledge of the local
ecosystem (Interview 10142011). Many of them had previously worked for local suppliers and
are familiar with equipment, local materials and regulations. "China is where all the suppliers
are." Moreover, the proximity to manufacturing and construction sites is helpful for resolving
problems and misunderstandings promptly. Most engineers spend a considerable amount of time
on building sites or in manufacturing plants, getting exposure to real problems as they occur.
This then informs their work in engineering and design (Interview 09072011).
The last example is of a European manufacturer of cable trays. The company began to set up
manufacturing operations in China last year. Although their products require rather sophisticated
manufacturing processes (due to quality requirements and long product lifetimes), company
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management considered the move to China inevitable: "If we don't localize, then the Chinese
power plants will at some point use Chinese suppliers" (Interview 09202011). The move to
China was facilitated by the availability of a large pool of human resources. The company chose
a location in China that has a large steel mill and "a lot of local factories that produce similar
products." This way, the company found it "easy to recruit talent [away] from other companies."
6.3.1 Summary
For many companies, Chinese labor means more than merely cheap labor. Companies value
large and diverse pools of low-skill low-cost and high-skill high-cost labor, benefitting from
synergies across sectors, educational policies, and certain Chinese cultural values. The broad
spectrum of different qualifications and costs, hands-on experience, and knowledge of local
ecosystems makes Chinese labor increasingly attractive for a variety of activities undertaken by
global companies. Like other industries, the nuclear industry has capitalized on these ripe
conditions.
6.4 Scale-up nation and innovative manufacturing
Related to government support and funding, but with its distinct features, is the Chinese ability
for rapid scale-up. In recent decades, China has become a global manufacturing center. Nahm
and Steinfeld (2011) called China a national system "specialized in rapid scale-up and cost
reduction." The Chinese abilities for scale-up and cost reduction manifest themselves across
diverse industrial sectors. Nahm and Steinfeld cite examples from wind turbine, solar
photovoltaics, and consumer electronics sectors.
In my research, I came across strong parallels to Nahm's and Steinfeld's observations,
particularly as observed in the wind turbine sector. Similar to the nuclear industry, wind turbine
manufacturing received extensive government support. The industry is supported by strong
domestic and international demand. Localization requirements and bulky products, expensive to
ship, further benefit local actors. Both the Chinese wind and nuclear power industries consist of
SOEs, private firms, foreign companies and partnerships as in joint ventures.
In the following section, I present cases that show how rapid scale-up and cost reduction are
important characteristics of companies in the nuclear power industry in China. For that purpose, I
distinguish between companies with low supply chain complexity and those with high supply
chain complexity.
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6.4.1 Low supply chain complexity
Among non-key equipment, many inputs to nuclear power plants have relatively simple and
short supply chains, sometimes only requiring raw materials such as steel, plastics or graphite.
Companies in this category produce components like pipes, cables, seals, cable trays, etc. For
these types of goods, competitiveness is largely determined by product quality, cost, delivery
time and attached services. These factors are influenced by the choice of raw material suppliers,
the origin and quality of manufacturing equipment, the management systems in place, and
workforce skills level.
Chinese companies have benefited from improvements in the quality of Chinese-made raw
materials (Interview 09052011). Often, such raw materials are priced significantly lower than
those of international counterparts, an advantage that carries over to companies further
downstream. Additionally, many Chinese companies have invested in state-of-the-art
manufacturing equipment from foreign companies, as well as in training on that equipment
(Interview 09202011; Interview 09202011). Enabling factors for these types of investments are
the high demand created through government policy as well as subsidies, for instance, from the
2008 stimulus plan. Chinese companies bought manufacturing equipment from foreign suppliers,
entered joint venture partnerships or, in some cases, wholly acquired foreign companies in an
attempt to not only obtain their machinery but also to absorb their process knowhow. This is
often accompanied by extensive testing and trial-and-error to gain manufacturing experience.
Sometimes local design institutes become involved and provide more systematic and academic
knowhow.
6.4.1.1 A Chinese stainless steel pipe company
An example is a Chinese pipe company from Jiangsu province (Interview 09202011). The
company is privately owned and has become a national leader in the production of stainless steel
pipes. It is the first Chinese private-owned enterprise that was able to produce pipes for nuclear
power plants that comply with European and American standards. In 2011, it entered European
and US markets. Its products are used in nuclear, chemical, oil and gas, shipbuilding,
papermaking, medical, food processing, aerospace, military and sea water desalination industries.
About four years ago, the quality of domestic stainless steel pipes was still poor anywhere in
China. Since then, the company has been able to produce pipes at quality levels that comply with
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required standards. The company saw especially rapid development after purchasing an Italian
machinery company and production lines from German machine tool companies. The pipe
company had originally focused on other process industries but in its recent development made a
push into the nuclear industry. For that purpose, it obtained government support representing a
Key Industry Project of the 2011 Central Budget Investment Plan. In 2010, the company invested
CNY 1 billion to expand its factory floor threefold, by 200,000 square meters, introducing 20
new production lines from abroad.
The Chinese pipe company has a supply contract for high-grade nuclear pipe steel with one of
three Japanese steel companies that can supply the type of raw material required. In addition, the
Chinese company has nuclear-grade pipe steel inventory that amounts to a few months of
production. Having secured reliable access to this raw material, whose global demand currently
exceeds supplies, the Chinese company now has a competitive advantage. As expected, the
company is doing well and receiving more international orders.
The company recently recruited a renowned former professor of metallurgy to head its R&D
department of 20 staff. The professor previously led a lab at a local design institute. The
company has also purchased testing equipment from the design institute. The R&D department is
now responsible for developing new production and quality control techniques.
Important factors in the pipe company's success were a long-term outlook with the promise of
sustained high demand in China, as well as government funding through the stimulus program.
Given these circumstances, the company was able to invest in state-of-the-art manufacturing
equipment and training. Other important factors include strategic raw materials sourcing and
involvement of local talent through recruitment from the design institute. Lastly, the company
could capitalize on previous experience it had gained in related sectors, such as the
petrochemical and oil and gas industries.
6.4.1.2 A Chinese graphite seal company
Graphite seals are used in many areas of power plants, usually to prevent leakage in pumps,
valves, pressure vessels, and between pipes. Originally, the market for nuclear power plant seals
in China was dominated by American and French firms. Chinese companies produced seals for
conventional industries only, as those seals had looser quality requirements. However, "since
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2008, Chinese companies have won every tender for these [nuclear] seals. We [Chinese seal
companies] have matured now." (Interview 09202011). A Chinese valve company I interviewed
offers large seals for nuclear power plants for one-third of the price of Western competitors. A
large portion of the company's cost savings comes from sourcing the graphite raw material from
a local Chinese supplier instead of a foreign supplier. The rings are then manufactured using new
imported presses and other imported equipment, a process that is well-established and does not
involve much tacit knowledge according to one of the company's engineers. Testing is done
using advanced equipment bought from a German company. According to the company's CEO,
companies like this one have expanded rapidly in recent years and largely taken over the Chinese
nuclear seal market.
The Chinese graphite seal company successfully entered a mature consolidated market. It
managed to do so by adopting established modes of manufacturing while substantially lowering
cost, mainly through local procurement of raw materials. The big price differential helped the
company to expand rapidly in the Chinese market. This company too benefited from previous
experience in a related sector, namely the chemical industry.
6.4.1.3 Summary
We have seen two examples of successful Chinese companies in the low supply chain
complexity end of the nuclear industry. The two companies developed and expanded rapidly in
recent years due to circumstances peculiar to the Chinese ecosystem. They married the adoption
of modern manufacturing processes and corresponding management systems with the ability to
lower costs in procurement, labor cost, and process optimization. These firms were able to draw
on experiences gained in related sectors before entering the nuclear industry. Other enabling
factors were a stable long-term outlook that created an environment conducive to large
investments, as well as government funding and support.
6.4.2 High supply chain complexity
Another group of companies are characterized by high complexity in their supply chains. This
includes companies that produce products with many different components - such as pumps,
turbines, motors and generators, valves, etc. - requiring assembly. Different principles apply to
such companies, which I point out as follows.
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Designs usually play a more important role in nuclear industry companies of high supply chain
complexity. Often, such companies obtained their initial designs through cooperation with
foreign partners, through reverse engineering, or through internal technology transfer (in the case
of foreign-owned enterprises in China) (Interview 09052011; Interview 10312011). Similar to
the case of the wind turbine industry presented by Nahm and Steinfeld, oftentimes these
companies' products are adapted to the Chinese manufacturing environment. The China
president of a European pump company that I interviewed called this process "chinesefication of
a product" (Interview 09052011). "Chinesefication" by that definition includes substituting
materials for cheaper or more accessible alternatives; adapting the manufacturing process to local
parameters, for instance the availability of low-cost labor; and organizing the supply chain
according to strengths and weaknesses of the surrounding ecosystem. The latter may involve
integrating parts with high margins, crucial intellectual property components and high demands
to quality and time-critical delivery, while sourcing others at low cost.
This group of companies benefits greatly from the variety of products and skills concentrated in
regions like the Pearl River Delta. Here, companies can acquire manpower and skills for setting
up in-house operations and for sourcing. Firms benefit from high industry density and advanced
transportation infrastructure, making it easier to visit partners and suppliers, for example.
In sum, these factors contribute to products achieving high quality standards at low cost.
Capitalizing on the unique characteristics of Chinese ecosystems such as around the Pearl River
Delta endows companies with a competitive edge to compete in markets domestic and global.
Companies in nuclear supply chains can equally benefit from these factors. Many companies in
the nuclear industry have attempted to exploit advantages described in this chapter to their
maximum extent. Companies that have not done so face increasing pressure to follow (Interview
10222011).
6.4.2.1 A European pump company
The points outlined above are well illustrated by a European company that produces pumps and
other types of metal machinery in Guangdong province. The company is a wholly foreign-owned
enterprise. Its workforce in China numbered around 1300 staff in 2011, with 200 new employees
being added every year (Interview 09052011).
83
The company produces designs in China that originate from different "product homes" around
the world, mostly from Europe. Designs are transferred from their respective product homes to
the China location through internal technology transfer. In China, the company has engineering
teams that adapt production processes and sometimes the designs themselves to the local
environment. This usually leads to different bills of materials with substitutions of original
materials to comparable materials easily accessible (and cheaper) on the Chinese market. The
designs need to be divided into components that are to be produced in-house or sourced
externally.
According to the China president of the company, designing and monitoring supply chains is a
core capability of the company. About 70% of all parts of a typical product are sourced
externally. The interviewee referred to Guangdong as a unique region where virtually every
component the company needs is manufactured locally, usually by a number of companies at
different quality levels and price levels. In this environment, the pump company's management
aims to optimize make-buy decisions and organize supply chains in a way that achieves large
cost savings for some parts while guaranteeing quality and reliability for other parts.
For cases where quality and timely delivery are crucial, the European company investigates ways
to integrate these activities. Since the company repeatedly encountered problems with externally
sourced steel castings for pumps, it eventually decided to build its own foundry to forge casings
in-house, which it did in cooperation with another European company. The in-house casings
foundry is now located next to its Guangdong manufacturing facility.
For sourced components, quality and delivery issues have been virtually eliminated over recent
years. This was accomplished through the use of a Supplier Relationship Management System
that allows for tracking of supplier-side progress at close intervals. About 40 employees track
progress in the factories of a few hundred suppliers daily. Each supplier is required to upload
predefined test results, photographs and manufacturing reports to an online system at regular
intervals. If a supplier fails to deliver updates, the European company's quality department
follows up quickly. In special cases, a quality department representative is dispatched to the
supplier's base within one day. The European company's China president stresged how
transportation and IT infrastructure in the Pearl River Delta has made a big difference for his
company, particularly in regard to its sourcing strategy. The local train and highway systems
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allow his employees to arrive at supplier sites within a few hours and within a radius of a few
hundred kilometers. The interviewee summarized this by saying: "Everything grows together so
quickly here."
The company now claims to be able to produce pumps and other equipment at European quality
levels but significantly cheaper than European based competitors. At this point, about 10% of the
production in China is sold back to Europe, the remaining portion is sold within China, Stan
countries, South Korea and Australia. In Europe, the company still deals with a problem of
product and quality perception and with prejudices. Although Chinese quality may match
European quality in this case, many European customers still prefer European-made products.
6.4.2.2 A Chinese and a European turbine-generator company
As another case, I present differences between a Chinese and a European turbine-generator
company (Interview 10312011). The Chinese company has its headquarters, engineering and
manufacturing departments in the same location in Northern China. The European company has
its headquarters and engineering departments in Europe and a joint manufacturing location with
its Chinese partner in Northern China as well as in other locations globally. The joint venture
buys forgings, steel plates, cables, seals, plastics, consumables and other components from
suppliers. It then machines and assembles turbines and generators. Low labor costs are less
important to these capital-intensive companies. Most of their processes are automated by heavy
manufacturing equipment from Germany and Italy. Long production lines are programmed and
operated by only a few staff.
Both companies use detailed production documents for each product, specifying production
inputs and processes. The European company offers full customization of its products and
creates a completely new set of production documents for each order. This means each order has
to be processed by the engineering department in Europe, which costs more time and resources,
and can lead to miscommunication. The interviewee who had worked for both European and
Chinese companies in this field stated, "In the European case, all changes have to go back to
R&D to be recalculated."
The Chinese company, however, works toward standardization of its designs. For each order
only small changes are made and they are made incrementally on top of a generic basic design.
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The basic design was transferred from a foreign company through an earlier partnership. Due to
the incremental changes, less engineering services are needed overall and management and
communication are simplified. Production documents can be modified rather than completely
remade. The interviewee said, "There are only a few changes, the rest is the same [in the Chinese
company's designs]. But then, China needs to produce lots of the same things. So that may
increase the speed and lower the cost." The Chinese company has been able to sell its turbines
and generators at lower prices this way. The turbines and generators of the European company
tend to be more efficient in turn. The European company is now trying to decrease its prices
while the Chinese company is working to improve efficiency and quality.
Management of the European company has aimed for cutting costs at its China location by 30%
each year. In 2010, cost cuts of 22% were achieved. Most cost cuts stemmed from the
substitution of materials and the localization of the supply chain. For instance, a special type of
fiber tape used for insulation originally sourced from an American company is now sourced from
a Chinese company at lower cost. Heavy forgings and steel plates, formerly imported from Japan
other foreign competitors now come from China. The representative of the European company
said, "We want to achieve 100% localization."
The two companies are converging. The European company tries to learn what the Chinese
company has done well: producing at low costs by adapting to the unique conditions of the
Chinese ecosystem. The Chinese company tries to learn what the European company has done
well: employing state-of-the-art machinery, processes and management systems.
The diversity of actors forces efficient and high quality companies to become more cost-effective
and low-cost companies to become more efficient and of higher quality. In this case too,
substituting materials as well as standardizing and simplifying designs play important roles,
leading to products of increasingly better quality and cost. Organizing and managing supply
chains in the unique Chinese manufacturing environment became a core capability for these
companies.
6.4.3 Summary
In this section I introduced cases that illustrate characteristics of Chinese manufacturing
ecosystems that led to companies adapting modern manufacturing techniques, scaling-up and
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expanding their operations quickly and balancing between quality and cost. The principles
behind these cases can apply to many branches of manufacturing industries. They certainly apply
to parts of nuclear supply chains, as illustrated in this section.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter I highlighted distinct characteristics of the Chinese manufacturing ecosystem that
affect its nuclear power industry. These characteristics include synergies across different industry
sectors, a credible long-term demand outlook in the nuclear power industry, a broad and diverse
pool of human resources and an ecosystem conducive to rapid adoption and scale-up of
manufacturing at low cost and at reasonable quality. These factors distinguish the nuclear power
industry in China from nuclear power industries in other parts of the world. Although other
nuclear power industries may share individual characteristics aspects, the combination of all is
unique to China.
In this thesis, I discussed characteristics of the global nuclear power industry with a special focus
on the Chinese nuclear power industry. To assess and fully appreciate characteristics of the
Chinese nuclear industry development, one has to take into account three major perspectives:
7 Conclusions
In this thesis, I discussed characteristics of the global nuclear power industry with a special focus
on the Chinese nuclear power industry. I addressed three specific perspectives in detail:
technology transfer and localization, global deverticalization and integration trends, and
idiosyncrasies of the Chinese manufacturing ecosystem as much they affect its nuclear power
industry.
I started out by investigating a prominent claim that surfaced in many debates on China's nuclear
expansion: Does the transfer of technology to the Chinese nuclear industry represent an
unprecedented case of naYvete that jeopardizes the future competitiveness of foreign nuclear
power companies? My research showed that technology transfer to the Chinese nuclear industry
far from represents an extraordinary case but rather follows common industry practice. The
nuclear power industry has been, from its inception, characterized by extensive cross-border
collaboration and transfer of equipment and knowledge. Furthermore, nuclear reactor vendors
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have come to benefit from these relationships by developing and deploying new products,
expanding their supplier pools and growing future partners.
To understand the Chinese nuclear power industry going forward I proposed examining two
aspects. First, the status quo of the global nuclear industry into which the Chinese nuclear
industry is growing. Second, unique features of the Chinese manufacturing and construction
ecosystem that affect the nuclear power industry in China.
On the first point, I identified two trends in the global nuclear power industry. The differences in
these trends are somewhat related to locations, government policies and corporate cultures; they
form two extremes of a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are deverticalized, private
companies like Westinghouse while at the other are highly integrated, SOEs like KEPCO. The
two types of companies each have their strengths and weaknesses across the innovation and
product cycle. One way for organizations to capitalize on their strengths and to mitigate their
weaknesses is to enter into cooperation with complementary organizations. For that reason,
partnerships between different nuclear power industry actors across the globe are becoming ever
more important. This also sheds new light on technology transfer and its implications. The
knowledge about other organizations, combined with trust and technological overlap that come
with technology transfer and localization, can be enabling factors for long-term partnerships
crucial in a dyadic world that demands co-development, bringing in new supply chains, sharing
financial burdens, capitalizing on brand names, and taking advantage of state support.
Idiosyncrasies of the Chinese manufacturing and construction ecosystem - indeed of the
country's economic development - affect the nuclear industry. I identified strong state support
and a reliable long-term demand outlook, synergies across developing industrial sectors, a large
and diverse pool of human resources, the ability to scale up and expand rapidly, and the marriage
of reasonable quality at low cost as important factors that helped nuclear power industry firms
mature in China.
I suggest these three major topic areas and their subtopics as crucial pillars upon which a
thorough understanding of the development of the Chinese nuclear power industry can rest.
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Chinese and foreign companies both need to understand the dynamics of global nuclear supply
chains and the Chinese nuclear industry in order to best position themselves to exploit
opportunities and avoid pitfalls in a global nuclear power industry with China as a major actor.
Bibliography
Aalto University. (2010). Case Olkiluoto 3 Nuclear Power Plant Project in Finland. Project
Business research group, Aalto University, Finland.
Ahmad, D., and Yan, Z. (1996). An overview of the construction industry in China. World Bank
Resident Mission in China. Retrieved from
http://heyblom.websites.xs4all.nl/website/newsletter/9701 /industrychina.pdf
Areva. (2010). Generation III+ Reactor Portfolio. Areva. Retrieved from http://www.areva.com
Areva. (2012). Areva Global Leader in Nuclear Energy. Areva. Retrieved from
http://www.areva.com
Aubouin, P. (2010). Areva Technical Days - Introduction. Areva. Retrieved from
http://www.areva.com
Brett, P. (2010). Safety Fears Raised at French Reactor. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com
Bull, A. (2010). The AP 1000 Nuclear Power Plant: Global Experience and UK Prospects.
Nuclear Institute - Western Branch. Retrieved from http://www.nuclearinst.com
CNEC. (2012). Company profile. China Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation.
Retrieved from http://www.cnecc.com/g630.aspx
Commeau, A. (1985). Technical Assistance to the Republic of Korea in the Manufacture of
Nuclear Components. Transactions of the Third International Conference on Nuclear
Technology Transfer: ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
Cowan, R. (1990). Nuclear power reactors: a study in technological lock-in. Journal of
Economic History.
David, P. A., and Rothwell, G. S. (1996). Measuring standardization: An application to the
American and French nuclear power industries. European Journal ofPolitical Economy,
12(2), 291-308.
89
Daya, A. (2010). South Korea Plans To Lend $10 Billion For U.A.E. Nuclear Plants. Bloomberg.
Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com
De Guio, J. M., and Robin, Y. (2012). Supply Chain Organization - Anticipating local Industry
Participation. Areva. Retrieved from http://polska.areva.com
Delene, J. G., and Hudson, C. R. (1990). Cost Estimate Guidelines for Advanced Nuclear Power
Technologies. Retrieved from http://www.osti.gov/bridge/ervlets/purl/6976069-
np2eTp/6976069.pdf
Donnelly, J. (1985). A Historical Perspective on Nuclear Technology Transfer. Transactions of
the Third International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer: ICONTT-III. Madrid,
Spain.
Doosan. (2008). Doosan wins a USD 288 million order for a new-type nuclear power plant in the
U.S. Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Retrieved from
http://www.doosan.com
Doosan. (2010). Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Signs Supply Contract for UAE
Nuclear Plant Facilities. Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Retrieved
from http://www.doosan.com
Dynabond. (2010). China Nuclear Engineering Group. Dynabond Powertech Service. Retrieved
from http://www.dynabondpowertech.com
ESEC. (2010). 2010/11 - 2012/13 Industrial Policy Action Plan. Economic Sectors and
Employment Cluster, South Africa Government. Retrieved from http://www.info.gov.za
Felmus, N. L. (1985). Transfer of Engineering Technology. Transactions of the Third
International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer: ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
Fine, C. (1999). Clockspeed: Winning industry control in the age of temporary advantage.
Perseus Books.
Gambhir, M. L. (2009). Concrete Technology - Theory and Practice. Tata McGraw-Hill
Education.
George, B. V. (1985). The Establishment of PWR Technology in the United Kingdom in Support
of the Sizewell B Project. Transactions of the Third International Conference on Nuclear
Technology Transfer: ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
Gokcek, et al. (1995). 1994 Capital and Busbar Cost Estimate.
Gulati, R., and Eppinger, S. (1996). The coupling ofproduct architecture and organizational
structure decisions. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
90
Hobday, M., Davies, A., and Prencipe, A. (2005). Systems integration: a core capability of the
modem corporation. Industrial and Corporate Change.
Hook, L. (2010). US group gives China details of nuclear technology. Financial Times.
Retrieved from http://www.ft.com
Hua, J., and Stanway, D. (2012). China launches new 650 MW nuclear reactor. Retrieved from
http://uk.reuters.com
Htittl, A. (1985). Ten Years of Experience in Technology Transfer for Turnkey Power Plants.
Transactions of the Third International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer:
ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
IAEA. (2009). Advanced Construction Methods for New Nuclear Power Plants. International
Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org
IAEA. (2012). Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. International Atomic Energy Agency.
Retrieved from http://www-pub.iaea.org
IEA. (2010). Projected Costs of Generating Electricity (2010 Edition). International Energy
Agency. Retrieved from http://www.iea.org
KSB. (2011). Pumps, Valves and Services for Nuclear Power Stations. KSB Aktiengesellschaft.
Katz, J. E., & Marwah, 0. S. (1982). Nuclear power in developing countries: an analysis of
decision making.
Klamann, E. (2009). China Guangdong Nuclear fund raises $1 bln. Retrieved from
http://www.reuters.com
Kouklik, I. (2012). Industrial Solution in Rosatom NPP Construction Projects (Localization,
Supply Chain Management, Technology Transfer). Social-Economic Impact of NPP
Construction Projects Implementation. . Retrieved from http://www.rosatom.ru
Kwon, J.-K. (1985). Transfer of Manufacturing Technology for Nuclear Power Plants.
Transactions of the Third International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer:
ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
Lemaire, M. (1985). Alsthom's Experience with Technical Cooperation in Nuclear Power Plants.
Transactions of the Third International Conference on Nuclear Technology Transfer:
ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
Lewe, C. K., and Couchman, D. L. (1977). Transfer of Nuclear Power Technology: A Practical
Approach. Annals ofNuclear Energy, 4.
91
Lightbridge. (2012). Next Generation Fuel Designs for Power Uprates. Retrieved from
http://www.ltbridge.com
Macalister, T., and Harvey, F. (2012). China in talks to build UK nuclear power plants. The
Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk
Macroaxis. (2012). Lightbridge Number of Employees. Retrieved from
http://www.macroaxis.com
Manyin, M. E., et al. (2012). U.S.-South Korea Relations. Congressional Research Service.
Matthews, R. G., and Jolis, A. (2007). Higher Steel Prices Expected As Inventories Start to Drop.
The Wall Street Journal.
McLain, S. (2010). UAE sets peaceful precedent in nuclear des in. The National. Retrieved from
http://www.thenational.ae
Molyneux, J. (2008). Presentation to Supplier Conference. Rolls-Royce. Retrieved from
https://www.ukap1000application.com/images/pdf/Presentation to Supplier Conference.pdf
NTI. (2012). China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved
from http://www.nti.org
Nahm, J., and Steinfeld, E. (2012). Scale-Up Nation: Chinese Specialization in Innovative
Manufacturing. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Navarro, P., and Autry, G. (2011). Death by China: Confronting the Dragon - A Global Call to
Action (p. 303). Pearson Prentice Hall.
NRC. (2012). The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). United State Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Retrieved from http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/students/animated-
pwr.html
Park, C. T. (1992). The experience of nuclear power development in the Republic of Korea
Growth and future challenge. Energy Policy, 20(8).
Patel, M. (2008). Supporting New Build and Nuclear Manufacturing in South Africa. Retrieved
from http://files.asme.org/Divisions/NED/16805.pdf
Paulson, C. K. (1985). Technology Development Cooperation: A Growing Trend in Technology
Transfer. Transactions of the Third International Conference on Nuclear Technology
Transfer. ICONTT-III. Madrid, Spain.
Pavitt, K. (2003). What are Advances in Knowledge Doing to the Large Industrial Firm in the
"New Economy"? The Industrial Dynamics of the New Digital Economy (p. 271). Edward
Elgar Publishing.
92
Peterson, P. F. (2005). The Future of Nuclear Energy: A California Perspective. California
Energy Commission 2005 Integrated Energy Policy Workshop.
Piore, M., & Sabel, C. (1984). The second industrial divide: possibilities for prosperity.
Power Engineering. (2011). Westinghouse teams with BAE, Doosan, Rolls-Royce to build
AP 1000 reactor in UK. Retrieved from http://www.power-eng.com
Prencipe, A. (2003). Corporate strategy and systems integration capabilities: Managing networks
in complex systems industries. The Business of Systems Integration.
Rosatom. (2010). Appendix 7 List of key organizations of Rosatom. Retrieved from
http://ar2010eng.rosatom.ru
Russia Forum. (2012). Rosatom. The Russia Forum 2012. Retrieved from
http://2012.therussiaforum.com/forum/companies/rosatom/
Sako, M. (2005). Modularity and Outsourcing. The Business of Systems Integration.
Samoshin, Y. (2012). Rosatom Global Nuclear Opportunities. Rosatom. Retrieved from
http://www.cnr-cme.ro/foren2012/PPT/RTF 3/Yury Samoshin.pdf
Sarnsamak, P. (2011). AEA expects 350 new plants by 2030. The Nation. Retrieved from
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/new/national/IAEA-expects-350-new-plants-by-2030-
30166948.html
Shen, S., and Takada, K. (2012). China Nuclear Company Plans I.P.O. to Help Fund Projects.
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com
Solingen, E. (1996). Industrial policy, technology, and international bargaining: designing ... (p.
311). Stanford University Press.
Sturgeon, T. J. (2002). Modular production networks: a new American model of industrial
organization. Industrial and Corporate Change.
Sturgeon, T. J. (2003). What really goes on in Silicon Valley? Spatial clustering and dispersal in
modular production networks. Journal of Economic Geography, 3(2), 199-225.
Subki, M. H. (2012). Small and Medium-sized Reactor Technology for Small Electricity Grids.
Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org
TVA. (2005). ABWR Cost/Schedule/COL Project at TVA's Bellefonte Site. Tennessee Valley
Authority. Retrieved from http://nuclear.gov/np2010/reports/mainReportAll5.pdf
Tatum, C. B. (1983). Innovations in Nuclear Concrete Construction. Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, 109(2),,131-145.
93
Teller, A. (2010). The EPRTM Reactor: Evolution to Gen III+ based on proven technology. Areva.
Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/lstDialogue Forum/1 5-Teller.pdf
Tomicek, L. (2011). Formation of ROSATOM Global Supply Chain. Retrieved from
http://www.atomeks.ru/mediafiles/u/files/presentAE20 11 /Tomicek(1).pdf
Tong, M. (2010). China Power Equipment, February 2010. Deutsche Bank Global Markets
Research.
Vickridge, I., and Lu, Y. (1999). Civil Engineering in China. Civil Enginerring , 132(Feb., 14-
23).
WNA China. (2012). Nuclear Power in China. World Nuclear Association. Retrieved from
http://world-nuclear.org
WNA Econ. (2012). The Economics of Nuclear Power. World Nuclear Association. Retrieved
from http://world-nuclear.org
WNA France. (2012). Nuclear Power in France. World Nuclear Association. Retrieved from
http://world-nuclear.org
WNA Heavy. (2012). Heavy Manufacturing of Power Plants. World Nuclear Association.
Retrieved from http://world-nuclear.org
WNA Russia. (2012). Nuclear Power in Russia. World Nuclear Association. Retrieved from
http://world-nuclear.org
WNA SMR. (2012). Small Nuclear Power Reactors. World Nuclear Association. Retrieved from
http://world-nuclear.org
WNA South Korea. (2012). Nuclear Power in South Korea. World Nuclear Association.
Retrieved from http://world-nuclear.org
WNA USA. (2012). Nuclear Power in the USA. World Nuclear Association. Retrieved from
http://world-nuclear.org
WNN. (2008). Doosan awarded further contract by Westinghouse. World Nuclear News.
Retrieved from http://www.world-nuclear-news.org
WNN. (2011). Major AP1000 component arrives at Sanmen. World Nuclear News. Retrieved
from http://www.world-nuclear-news.org
WNN. (2012). Partial ruling on Olkiluoto 3. World Nuclear News. Retrieved from
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org
94
Wallace, E. (2005). From field to factory - Taking advantage of shop manufacturing for the
pebble bed modular reactor.
Webb, J. (2011). Senator Webb introduces legislation to stop "giving away" taxpayer-funded
technologies to China. Retrieved from
http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2011-10-04-02.cfm
Westinghouse. (2003). The Westinghouse AP1000 Advanced Nuclear Plant. Westinghouse
Electric Co. Retrieved from http://www.westinghousenuclear.com
Westinghouse. (2007). AP1000: Ready to Meet Tomorrow's Power Generation Requirements
Today. Westinghouse Electric Co. Retrieved from http://www.westinghousenuclear.com
Westinghouse. (2009a). Westinghouse, KNF To Form Joint Venture Company To Manufacture
Control Element Assemblies. Westinghouse Electric Co. Retrieved from
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com
Westinghouse. (2009b). Westinghouse Teams with Shaw Group/Laing O'Rourke for UK
Nuclear New Build Effort. Westinghouse Electric Co. Retrieved from
https://www.ukap1000application.com
Westinghouse. (2010). Westinghouse Profile. Westinghouse Electric Co. Retrieved from
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com
Westinghouse. (2012). No company is more focused on nuclear technology. Retrieved from
http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/docs/WestinghouseProfile.pdf
Xu, W., and Schaps, K. (2012). China nuclear firms team for UK project bid-sources. Reuters.
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com
Xu, Y. (2010). The Politics of Nuclear Energy in China (Vol. 2010, p. 272). Palgrave Macmillan.
Yuan, X. (2012). Company Special: Westinghouse talks benefits of nuclear energy. China Daily.
Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn
Zhang, Z., and Sun, Y. (2007). Economic potential of modular reactor nuclear power plants
based on the Chinese HTR-PM project. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 23 7(23), 2265-
2274.
Zhao, Z., et al. (2009). Performance and strategy of Chinese contractors in the international
market. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management.
Zhou, Y. (2010). Why is China going nuclear? Energy Policy, 38(7), 3755-3762.
Zhou, Y., et al. (2011). Is China ready for its nuclear expansion? Energy Policy, 39(2), 771-78 1.
95
